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I,H Dt-umber. 1-J51 
To the Right Honourable the Secretary oJ State Jor the Home Department. 
SIR. 
I have the honour to repon thal in obedience to the Order made under 
Section 14 of Ihe Petroleum (Consolidation) Act. 1928. and dated Ihe 7th 
September. 1951. 1 have held an Inquiry into the causes of and circumstance:, 
attending the fatal accident which occurred on tbe 6th September. 1951. at the 
premises of the Regent Oil Company, Limited. at the Royal Edward Dock. 
Avonmouth. Bristol. 
By this accident two lives were 105t. namely:­
RoyslOn Douglas Hyett. aged 33 years. married. and 
Artbur Charle\ Bagg�. aged 38 ),ears. married. 
I also attended the adjourned Inquest. held at the Coroner'� Court. Bristol. 
on the Sib November. 1951. by Mc. A. E. Barker. Coroner for Bristol. 
when the Jury returned a verdict of death by misadventure Jue to an 
explosion. tbe cause for which was unknown. 
Description of the premises 
The premises of the Regent Oil Company. Limi ted. at the Roy.!1 Edwdfd 
Dock. in which the accident occurred are known as No. I Depot and covered 
an area of about seven acres situated on the bank of the river Severn. This 
depot was licensed by the Council of the City and County of BrislOl a� 
the Harbour AuthorIty. for the storage of 12.000.000 gallons of petroleum 
spirit. There was another depot called No. 2 Depot in the vicinity and the 
two depots together were capable of storing 70.000 tons of petroleulll in over­
ground steel tanks. o. 2 Depot was licensed for the storage of 5.300.000 
gallons of petroleum spirit. In No. 1 Depot groups of lank� were .�urrollnded 
by a tapered reinforced concrete wall ,lbout 4 inches thick at the top. 
This wall served as a bund to prevent the outnow of petroleum in the event 
of the contents of the tanks escaping. The bund in which Ihe fire occurred 
is that shown on the plan in Appendix I in which Tanks os. I. 2. 3, .J. 13. 14, 
5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 27 and 28 are situaled. There was a cenl,,1 pump 
house adjoining thi� bund situated in its own compound. and also \urrounded 
by a tapered reinforced concrete wall. Tankers were discharged from a jetty 
by means of a 10 inch diameter eanhed pipe-line which ran from the 
jelly to the depot for a distance of about 3.250 feet. Separate pipe-lines 
were used for Ihe different products. 
Circumstances leading up to the fire 
At aboul 11.15 p.m. on the 5th Sep,ember. 1951. Ihe lank.r "Fort 
Chcistina ... belonging to the Overseas Tankship (United Kingdom) Limited 
arrived and tied up at No. 5 berth at the oil basin. Royal Edward Dod. 
The cargo consisted of about 13.000 toilS of motor spirit and 2.050 tall"! 
• Now known as Cattex Glasgow. 
. -
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of gal; 011 rhc arrangement of the tank compiJrtments In the tanler were 
stated to be J� follows: 
No. I tJnl consisted of port and starboard tanl compartment�. 
os. 2·9 tank, mclu ... i\-e. Each consi,ted of porl. (entre and starboard 
IJnl \.'ompartmenh. 
All the ;.:ompartment ... of Tanl::r. .\O!:l. I to � mdu.,i\-e \ ... ere loaded with 
mOlor "'pirit. Jno the three compartments of No. 9 tank were loaded wnh 
�a'll)il on the I-Ith and 15th August at Bahrein. The na,h point of the gas oil 
III tanl No. 9. <.1'1 determined at Bahrein. was stated to ha\e been 174 F. 
On the arri\i.iI of the tanler "-'1r. IlIingwOrlh. the A .... "'i')tant Superintendent 
of the depot. coller.:ted the .ship·s papers in the u ... ual wa) when he met 
Caplaln Watson. the Port Captain of Overseao; Tanlship (United Kingdom) 
Lirmtcd, together \\ ith the ship's master. It \ ... ·as understood that Captain 
WaLson wl.�hed to see Mr. l IIingworth a'i. on about the 18th August the 
motor "'pirit in No. 8 starboard lank overflowed. but eventually the level 
in No. 8 ... tarb()ard tank was counter-balanced b�' the level of the gas oil 
in No. 9 starboi.lru tJnk. and it was feared thOlt there had been some con­
tammatlOn. betwL'en the gas oil and the motor �pirit of the cargo. Accord· 
IIlgl} he WJ ... hcu thdt the contents of the section� of the \hip JIlvolv.:u �hould 
be carefully tC\led The Captains stated that in their opinion the .::ontenls 
of rank, No . .,. I to 7 indusi\"e were all right. but tht!y feared that con· 
taminatlon had taken place between the tranwer ... ..! bullhcJd ,e-parating 
t..tnk.., Rand 9. but the) did not know to what e:t'enl. \-tr IlIingworth 
arranged for the tC"ler. Mr Davis. to test personally thc samples taken from 
each of the l:ompartments of Tanks 8 and 9 and ... ample ... were Ollso taken 
from Tank., I to 7 The re ... ults of these tests '�how::d that the onl) tank. 
to be affected \" .. l� 'l"o. 8 �tarboard tOlnk. and this tanl was f und 10 be 
'icriou,l) contaminated With ga .... oil. The contents of all the other tanls 
\\-ere within their specification. Detail:> of the e.'(amIll3tJon of the samples 
lak.en from "\10. 8 starboard tank. and an 3\-crage samole frolll tanks I to 7 
mclu"'l\c .Ire contained 111 Appendi:t 2. 
Th� HlIller walli originally destined to discharg.e her cargo at Dublin but 
(lwing 10 the ... tnke at that POrt she wa') di\crtcd to A\onrnouth. 
1 he Shell Company were to take -t.OOO tons of motor �rirlt and 1.000 ton� 
of ga� 011 f rolll the tanker. and consequent I) this Compall) also took. 
... i.lmplcs from the contents of each of the comnartmcnh of t.:lnks Nos. 8 
and 9. and their final dl!cision was in agreement with that arnved at by the 
Regent Company. namely that No. 8 starboard wa, the onb,. 1'.lIlk which was 
contaminated 
In \ Ie\\ nf thl.! fdet thJt the motor SpUlllll ..... l). J l..tnh. \\.1' lil for dl:'Lh.Hg� 
..trrangement... were mJde to start pumping \\ Ilh the ship's pumps from the 
lank mto ,11Orc tanh 32 and .. S" in the Re'!clH Comran�"'" Den.1t '\'0. 2 
JI about I 10 �I.m. on the 6th September. rhis \\a, done to aHlId hold1l1g 
lip the �hip and this operation was carried on till later in the morning. 
Neither of these Iwo shore tank.s was in an\" \\ ay affectcd by the subsequent 
fire. \t about 9.15 3.01. on 'he 6th .;eptember. after further discussions 
betwecn Mr. llIio!lworth and the two Captains and Mate. it W� decided 
to pump out No. 8 starboard and No. 8 port tanls as contaminated motor 
spirit into No. 3 ... hore tank. in the Regent Compan\'s Depot No. J. This 
shore tank alrcad) contain:d about 1,150 ton� of motor spirit and wa.:. the 
smallest lank. a\.tilablc. The two \\ing tank., were to ht: pumped out 
Together (0 Irim the \"essel 
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At the same lime No. 9 starboard and pon tanks were to be pumped out 
into No. 1 shore tank in the Regent Company's Depot No. I. and these 
pumping operations were to be simultaneous. but the discharge from No. 8 
wing tanks was to be slightly ahead of the discharge from No. 9 wing tanks 
so that the level of the motor spirit in o. 8 tanks should be about two 
feel below the level of the gas oil in No. 9 tanks. In this way it was thought 
any more contamination would result in further contamination of the motor 
spirit instead of contamination of the gas oil. 
Before this operation was commenced Mr. U1ingworth obtained agreement 
of Mr. Cumming at the head office of the Company. Meanwhile they were 
proceeding with pumping operations from tanks I to 7 into shore tanks 
32 and" S" in their No. 2 Depot. During pumping operations the tanker 
was having trouble with Lhe pumps and an engineer had to go down into 
the pump room to stan and stop the motors. 
At about I I  a.m. the pumping of motor spirit into shore tanks 32 and" S " 
was stopped, and the valves on these two tanks were closed. and they started 
pumping No. 8 wing tanks into No. 3 shore tank. 
After about 15 mmutes they started pumping tbe gas oil from o. 9 wing 
tanks into No. I shore tank (about 6,9 00 water tons capacity). Directly 
after starting to pump the gas oil Mr. 1I1ingwonh drew a sample of gas 
oil from the pipe line at the jetty from the dead leg. The pipe connection 
at the jetty was in the form of a ., Y ". One limb of the .• Y ,. was con­
nected to the tanker. and the other limb was blanked orr. The latter limb 
is the dead leg. Separate" Y .. connections are kept for each product. The 
sample flashed below 73 F. A second sample was drawn which flashed 
at 840 F. The pumping of the gas oil was slopped immediately. This took 
place at approximately 11.35 a.m. 
'3y tbis time about 120 tons of gas oil bad already been pumped into No. I 
shore tank. Meanwhile the pumping of the motor spirit from No. 8 wing 
tanks continued. 
A check sample was then taken from No. 1 shore tank and it was found 
that the gas oil in this tank was not affected. Mr. Davis asked Hyett for 
a top sample from shore lank No. I and this sample had a Hash point of 
160Q F. The pumping of the motor spirit fr0111 No. 8 wing tank was com­
pleted at about 2 p.m. Just before finishing this operation it was decided 
to pump out tbe gas oil again, and another sample was drawn from the" dead 
leg" of we gas oil line and this flashed at 1500 F. Arrangements were then 
made to pump about 75 tons of gas oil into No. 13 shore tank in order 
to clear the pipe Ene and Hyen was instructed accordingly. The shore tank 
No. 13 which was 18 feet high and 20 feet in diameter contained about 
40 tons of gas oil whioh would be equivalent to a dip of about 5 it. and 
Hyeu was told to take gas oil from the tanker into this short tank until the 
dip was 15 ft. and that if the ship had not stopped pumping by tbe time 
this dip bad been reached. he was to divert the gas oil into shore tank 
No. J .  Hyett was told to go on the top of shore lank No. 13 and watch 
the oil in through the manhole, as the ship might possibly be unrealiable for 
speed and it migbt Come up quiCkly. This procedure was adopted because 
Mr. TUingworth and Mr. Davis tbought that sometbing had been trapped 
in the gas oil line and that the last sample was not a true one. and they 
wanted to avoid pumping contaminated material into No. I shore tank. 
Before tbey started pumping the gas oil into No. 13 shore tank Mr. 
llIingworth remained on the tanker and saw that the pressure on the gas 
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oil pipe line was brought up to 25 Ibs. per square lOch instead of the usual 
pressure of 75 Ibs. per square incb. It was thought that at this pressure 
the gas oil would be pumped through at a rate of about 150 tons per 
bour. They started to pump tbe gas oil at about 2.30 p.m. and about two 
minutes after this Mr. IUingworth drew a further sample of gas oil from 
tbe •. Jive leg" and took it  to Mr. Davis at tbe laboratory for testing (the 
" Jive leg" is the Jimb connected to tbe tanker). 
At 2.30 p.m. Mr. Davis took gallon samples of o. 9 port. centre and 
starboard compartments for examination and the results were as folJows:-
Tank 
Specific b'TaYil), 
Flash POlOt F. 
.. 
No. 9 Port 
0·8340 
166 
o. 9 Centre 
0·8340 
158 
No. 9 Starboard 
0·8340 
162 
The line sample of gas oil which was taken by Mr. llIingworth was being 
tested by Mr. Davis. and the temperature of 104 F. had been reached. 
without flashing. when an explosion and fire occurred at tbe shore tank 
o. 13. The fire was observed to take place at 2.47 p.m. 
l n  the meantime after tbe No. 8 wing tanks had been pumped out into 
shore lank No. 3. they proceeded with the general discharge of the motor 
spirit cargo from No. 6 tank and this was being pumped into shore tanks 
Nos. 32. 3 and" S ". 
Baggs was in charge of loading motor spirit from shore tank No. 2 into 
barges for Cardirr. and at the time of the accident spirit was being pumped 
Into the barge .. Ribblesdale" by Vicker who relieved Baggs just after 
2 p.m. 
Vicker was standing between tbe pump house and shore tank No. 19 
at about 2.40 p.m. in full view of the shore tanks Nos. 13 and 14. He 
stated that he saw HyelL and Baggs on the top of shore tank No. 14. Hyell 
was dipping the tank and Baggs was talking to him. He went back into 
the pump house to see if the pumps were running correctly and then 
came out again. When he came back to the same place from which he 
had seen the two men before. he noticed that Baggs had moved from the 
top of the lank and was standing on the ladder running between the two 
shore (anks Nos. 13 and 14. Hyett was in the same place as before still 
dipping. The next thing Vicker saw was a ring of fire round the top of 
shore tank o. 14 and Hyett was lifted up ofT the tank towards (he railway 
siding. He returned to the pump house. shut the pumps down and closed 
the valves which were in use for supplying motor spirit to the Barge" Ribble .. · 
dale", but he omitted to close tbe suction valve on No. 2 shore tank. No 
other pumps were working. It seems possible that Vickers was mistaken 
in thinking that Hyelt was on shore tank No. 14. The evidence of all 
tbe witnesses was to tbe effect that he was on shore tank No. 13. 
Palter. a jetty hand. was on duty at tbe jetty to which tbe tanker " Fort 
Christina " was moored and between 2.45 and 2.50 p.m. he heard an explosion 
and saw smoke and names. He shouted to tbe lan�er crew to stop their 
pumps as he thought that the fire and explosion had occurred in one of 
tbe tanks at the Regent Company's Depot. The ship's pumps were shut 
down and all the jetty valves and intermediate valves from the jelly to 
the depot were closed. The Chief Clerk. Mr. Ansell. phoned for the Fire 
Brigade but he was told that the fire had been reported two seconds earlier. 
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ProgJeIili of_ the Fire 
The fire and explosion started in No. 13 lank and the flames spread with 
great rapidity and reached the roofs of the tanks Nos. 5 and 6 which con­
tained aviation spirit and mOlor spirit respectively. The names were fanned 
by a northerly wind which was blowing at about 6 miles per hour. 
Within about 25 minutes the horizontal tanks 7, 8, 9. 10. 11, 12 27 and 
28 containing benzole aviation spirit and mOJor spirit were involved. The 
ends of these tanks were blown out and their contents dispersed ioto the 
compound. The suction valve on No. 6 tank was open and the contenLS of 
this lank added to the connagraLion. The names then spread towards tanks 
Nos. 4, 3 and 2. Flames ran down the irrigation ditches towards the river 
and down towards tank No. l. The names came over the bund wall 
and set fire to the sleeper stop blocks on the siding in which there were 
three rail tank wagons loaded with aviation spirit. 
At the time of the outbreak of tbe fire three road lank wagons were ;n 
process of being fiUed with spirit from the horizontal tanks and tank No. 6. 
Tbese road tank wagons were got away safely and Lbe rail tank wagons 
were also removed to safety. 
The Depot fire fighters went into action quickly and ran two depot hoses 
out into the yard. There was insufficient water pressure to reach the tops 
of tbe tanks as water was being used to cool the tanks in other depots. 
The depot foam hopper was brought into action before the overhead hori­
zontal tanks were involved in the fire, but the men were ordered out o[ 
the yard by the Fire Brigade. Subsequently O'Neill played foam on to 
tanks 3 and 4. and beat the Hames back to the steps near tank 13. The fire 
in this part of the compound was then under control with a blanket of 
foam over it. This was done to try and confine the fire to tanks 5 and 6. 
The 8 inch salt water mains were being used for coolmg tanks in other 
depots. but it was between 4 and 4.30 p.m. before any serious cooling of 
tanks took place. 
Shore tanks Nos. 3 and 4 were soon involved and No. 3 collapsed at about 
4 a.m. on the 7th September. 
There was a general conflagration in the bund containing the tanks I. 2. 3. 
4.5,6, etc .. owing to the contents of the tanks 6, 7, 8, 9. 10, I I. 12,27 and 28 
Howing towards tanks 4. 3. 2. and I, and subsequently No. 2 added about 
3,000 tons of motor spirit to the fire. The pipe line to this lank was frac­
tured near this tank and No. 3 tank. The fire lasted about 38 hours, and 
when it was finally extinguished there was still a layer of several inches of 
motor spirit floating on about 18 inches of water in the bund. 
When the level of the water in the bund was lowered it was found that 
the shore lank o. 2 continued to discharge motor spirit into the bund 
until the tank outlet was plugged. 
Result of the 6re 
When the water and motor spirit was finally drained from the bund it was 
found that all the pipe lines within the bund running beside the tanks I.  2. 3 
and 4 had all been fractured. Tbe vertical tanks Nos. 5, 6, 16 and 1 although 
damaged were still standing: tanks Nos. 13. 4 and 3 had collapsed and tank 
No. 2 bad partially collapsed. The horizontal tanks 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 
27 and 28 had their ends blown out. 
Human remains were found. inside tank No. J 3. and also a few feet 
forward of this tank towards No. 4 tank. 
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One of the large vertical tanks (No. 3) was noated 4 feet from its seating. 
The reinforced concrete bund wall was damaged in se\<eral places. 
The total qualllity of petroleum involved In the fire amounted to about 
7.000 Ions. 
The (allowing table shows the dimensions of the tanls In the bund in 
which the fire occurred together with tbe nature aDd quantity of tbe products 
In the tanks before and after the fire, and the condition of the suction valves 
on the tanks. 
Dimensions Quantity of Condition 
of tank Nature of Product III tanl. of Suction 
Tank Product Vah'e 
No. corllalDed during 
DllImeter in tank Before After Ill' Height 

























95 35 Gas Oil ... 
95 35 Motor Spirit 
70 35 Motor Spirit 
65 35 Motor Spint 
32 25 Aviation Spirit 
25 25 Motor Spint 
9 30 long MOlor Spirit 
9 15 long Motor Spirit 
Three ompan· t Aviation Spirit 
menl horizontal 
tank AVIation SPIrit 
9 30 long l 
AViatIon SPlnt , T"o Compart- { Benzole ... 
men! hOrizontal 
tank 
IJ 30 long BenzoIc ... 
20 18 Gas 01  .. 












































{ Open Open Open 
Not known 




The tanks Nos. 1,2,3,4,5,6,13 and 14 were verlleal tanks, and tanks Nos. 8,9 and 10 
conSisted of three compartments of a horizontal tank 9 fect In diameter and 30 feel long, 
tanks Nos. 27 and 28 consisted of two CQmparlments of a horizontal tank 9 feet in diameter 
and 30 fett long and tank No. 7 consisted of a hOrizontal tank 9 fccl in diameter and 30 feet 
long. 
Cause of the explosion 
In order to bring about the explosion and fire twO conditions are necessary, 
namely (I) the presence of an explosive atmospbere in lank No. 13 and (2) 
some means of ignitmg this explosive allllospherc in tanh. No. 13. 
(I) The presence of an explosive atmosphere in tank No. 13 
The temperature of the contents of tank o. 13 prior to the explosion was 
not as higb as Ihe flash point of gas oil (about 160 F.): this is confirmed by 
the Director of the Meteorological Office who Slaled Ihat from the observa· 
tlons made at Filton on the 6th September. 1951. the maximum temperature 
during the period 6·18 hours was 71 F. The details supplied by tbe Meteoro­
logical Omce arc contained in Appendi'( 3 attached. The flash point of the 
gas oil in tank No. 13 before pumping operations began was 170· F. Accord­
ingly, it is quite clear Ihal il was not gas oil vapour which caused the explosion, 
.h the temperature of the flash point of gas oil had not been attained. 
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It therefore follows that some other ignitable mixture l11ust have been pre-sent 
iD this tank. One possibility appears to be that petroleum spirit may have 
been introduced into the tank by the pumping operations from the" Fort 
Christina ". 
Assuming that petroleum spirit had been introduced into this tank. and also 
that the rate of pumping from the ship had been kept constant at about 150 
tons per hour. the height of the liquid in lank No. 13 at the time of the 
explosion would have risen to 10 feet. thus leaving a free space in the tank of 
about 8 feet. Under these conditions it would be necessary for about It 
gallons of petroleum spirit to have been present in the form o{ vapour to 
render the free space e.'(piosive. H. however. the rate o{ pumping was faster .. 
the free space in lank No. 13 would be reduced, and therefore the quantit}' 
of petroleum spirit required to render the free space explosive would be 
correspondingly r:educed. Furthermore if petroleum spirit vapour were present 
in tank No. 13 the conditions produced by pumping operations from the 
tanker, by continuously reducing the free space in tank No. 13. would cause 
the atmosphere in that tank to pass through all the conditions {ram a weak 
non·explosive to an explosive and then a rich non-explosive mixture of pet­
roleum spirit vapour in air. owing to the continuous displacement of the air 
in the free space above the liquid in tank o. 13. The condition for an 
explosive mixture is that the percentage of petroleum spirit vapour in the 
free space should be between 11 to 6 per cent. 
The question then arises as to how the petroleum spim was introduced into 
tank No. 13 as this tank was used {or gas oil. 
At Bahrein the ullage of No. 8 starboard tank was 4 feet at 970 F. and the 
ullage of No. 9 starboard tank was 4 feet 21 inches at 1080 F. 
During the voyage from Bahrein to this country it is quite clear that there 
was a leak between tanks os. 8 and 9 in the tanker .• Fort Chrislina t· as the 
level of the motor spirit in No. 8 starboard lank had risen. overflowed and 
firally the levels in the two tanks were equalised. The ullages o{ No. 8 
starboard tank and No. 9 starboard tank at Avonmoulh were 3 feet 2i inches 
and 7 feet Sf inches respectively. On the arrival of the tanker at Avonmouth 
the results of the e;'(amination of the samples o{ motor spirit taken from No. 8 
starboard tank. and an average sample of motor spirit taken from tanks os. I 
to 7 inclusive showed that the contents of No. 8 starboard tank were seriously 
contaminated with gas oil. The details of this c;'(amination are contained 
in Appendix 2. This conclusion was confirmed by the examination carried 
out by the Sbell Me. & B.P. Company. 
Further. when the 
.
. Fort Christina .. left A vonmouth tile quantity of liquid 
in No. 8 starboard tank amounted to 7 tons. The tanker then proceeded to 
Hamble and Plymouth where she discharged 1.043 tons and 682 tons of gas 
oil respectively from o. 9 tank. When she arrived at Hamble the quantity 
of liquid in No. 8 starboard tank amounted to 70 tons. It is therefore quite 
clear that the motor spirit contained in No. 8 starboard tank of the .• Fort 
Christina to was contaminated with gas oil. There I11Ust also have been 
some contamination of gas oil in No. 9 tank with motor spirit as the flash 
point of the gas oil at Bahrein was stated to have been 1740 F. and this. on 
arrival at Avonmouth. was reduced to 166' F. in No. 9 port tank. 158 F. 
jn No. 9 centre tank and 162 F. in No. 9 starboard tank. A bulk sample 
from the three compartments was also taken by Shell Me� & RP. at Avon� 
mouth. and the flash point was found to be 1640 F. 
The various possible ways in which contamination could have taken place 
were considered. such as leaking valves on pipe lines or a leaking bulkhead 
between tanks 8 and 9, or leaking valves between the two ship's pumps used 
9 
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ror pumping motor �Plril and gas 011. After the tanker left this country in 
September. 1951. �he was overhauled by the Sun Shipbuilding Company at 
Chester. Pennsylvania, U.S.A .. during the following month and an examina· 
lion was also carried out. The tanker returned to Avonmouth loaded with 
kerosene on the 12th 0\ ember. 1951, when Mr. D. \V. Gellmg. Senior 
Lnginccr Surveyor, Mmlstry of Transport. went aboard and obtained details 
of the repairs carried out in America. A meeting was held in London with 
the rcprcsent3U\CS of the owners who !o>upplicd drawings showing the arrange· 
mCnLS of the plpc hnes In the vessel and the question of leakage was dls· 
cussed with them in conjunction wilh Mr. A. H. Wilson. Senior Engineer 
Surveyor. 11fl1�try of Transport. It was stated that the valves on the pipe 
)lIle were le�tcd in America and found to be tight: it was also slated that 
the valve� between the pumps pumping motor spirit and gas oil were blanked 
ofT during pumpmg operations. The examtnation in America failed to dis· 
close a lea!... In the bulkhead separating Nos. 8 and 9 starboard tanks. 
It thcrdore appears probable tbat contamination of Nos. 8 and 9 starboard 
tanks must have taken place through a faulty weld in the bulkhead separating 
these two tanh. Thcre was no other way 10 which contamination could 
occur at the depot at Avonmouth as separate pipe lines and connections 
were used for motor spirit and gas oil. 
Further and conclusive e\ idence of contamination was furnished by the 
samples which were taJ.. en from the pipe line at the jetty wbilst gas oil 
was being pumped from the tanker to No. t sbore tank. The first sample 
taken had a flash point belo\\ 73 F. and a second sample had a flash point 
of 84 F. Subsequently a further sample was taken and this bad a flash 
pomt of 150 F. It therefore seems fairly certain that the gas oil that was 
being pumped Into o. 13 sbore lank was contaminated with motor spirit. 
11 was �ubsequcntly found tbat the admixture of 2 per cent. by volume of 
motor spirit reduced the flash point of the gas oil to 84 F .. whilst the 
addilion of 3 per Cent. b) vulume of mOlor spirit reduced the flash point to 
below 66 F. 
(2) Some means of igniting the explosive atmosphere in shore tank No. J3 
fhere 3re a number of possible sources of Ignition which may bave fired 
the e:\plosl\ie atmosphere in shore tank No. 13 and these are as follows:­
(a) Smoking. 
(b) A spark produced by a locomotive in the sidmg close to the tank. 
(c) Lightning. 
(d) Micro-biologlc.1i actJon. 
(e) Une"ploded bomb dropped during the last war. 
<f) Electrical causes:-
(i) Stray eanh currents. 
(ii) Fauh) current or leakage from the electrical installation. 
(iii) Static electricity. 
Taklllg these poSSibilities 111 order I think that «(I), (b), (c). (d <tnd (f) 
(i) and (ii) ma) be eliminated for the following reasons :-
(il) Smoking 
Both Baggs and Hyell were experienced and truMed men. and quite apart 
rrom this thc) were working in full view of the yard ilnd tbe office. and it is 
extremely unhkcl) that the) were smoking during the operation of pumping 
gas oil into shore tan)... o. 13. 
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(b) A spark produced b) a locomotive in the siding close to the tank 
At the time of the explosion there were no locomotives in operation at the 
Regent Company's oil installation. I was informed tbat the nearest locomo­
tive was between the Cleveland Company's Depot and the Abldan Depol 
belonging to Shell Mex and B.P. This was at least 300 feet away. In view 
of the distance and the fact that tbe wind at the lime would blow the spark 
away from tbe tank. this possibility can be ruled oUL 
(c) Lightning 
The Meteorological Office have no record of any electrical disturbanCe;! 
in the Avonmouth area on the day of the accident. (See Appendix 3.) This 
possibility can therefore be dismissed. 
(d) Micro-biological action 
Tt is known that when tankers discharge different products they frequently 
clear their manifolds by pumping sea water through them to prevent con­
tamination. Accordingly the Company had water bottoms in their gas 
oil storage tanks at Avonmouth. It was also stated that there was a good 
deal of corrosion of the tanks where the water bottom was situated. lo 
view of this. and also of the facI that sewage might be discharged into the 
river Avon. it appeared that tbe water bottom of shore tank No. 13 might 
have contained sulphate-reducing bacteria. and these organisms may have 
produced some iron sulphide which might have ignited spontaneously \\ hen 
brought into contact with air. The contents of shore tank No. 1 3  were 
being disturbed by HyCH whilst dipping the tank. 
It was not possible to obtain a sample from the water bottom of shore 
tank No. 13 after the accident. but samples were obtained from shore tanks 
Nos. 18 and 30. Both these shore tanks \\ere used for the storage of gas 
oil and the water bottoms in these two tanks would be comparable with 
that in shore tank No. 13. These samples were submitted to the Chemical 
Research Laboratory. Teddington, for examination. and sulphate-reducing 
bacteria were found to be present in the water bottom obtained from shore 
tank No. 30. (See Appendix No. 4.) It is therefore possible that they 
may also have been present in the bottom of shore tank No. 13.  (( is 
possible that pyrophoric iron sulphide may have been present in shore tank 
No. 1 3  and glowing iron sulphide in this tank: may have caused the ignition. 
(e) Uucxploded bomb dropped during the Jast war 
An unexploded 500 kilogram bomb was recovered from No. 2 Depot of 
the Regent Oil Company Limited. on the 27th December. 1948. and it was 
thought that this accident may perhaps have been caused by the explojioo 
of an unexploded bomb. In order to investigate this pOS.,lbllity it was 
arranged for the ground underneath tank �o. 13 La be eumined when It was 
dismantled. This examination was carried out by the omcc� of the Bomb 
Disposal Unit and nothing was found La indicate Ihe explosion of an un­
exploded bomb. Thi!) po ibility can therefore be dismisliied. 
{/} Electrical causes 
The 1 0  inch pipe line running from the jell} to the depot W3.,. as 
previously stated. about 3.250 feet long. This pipe line was connected 10 
shore tank No. 13. by means of a 6 inch pipe line about 50 feel long. This 
6 inch pipe line delivered oil into this tank a1 roof level and not al the 
bottom of the tank. so that during pumping operations the oil would drop 
from the top of the tank. 
I 1 
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If the tanker pumped at a constant rate of about 150 tons per hour It 
I� c�tllni.ttcd that the level of tbe oil in shore tank No. 13 would have risen 
a height of 5 feel from the time of starting pumping into this lank until the 
explosion occurred. On this assumption the linear velocity of the oil in 
the 10 inch diameter pipe line would be about 3.2 feet per second. and the 
iJnear velocity In the 6 inch diameter pipe line would be about 9 feet per 
second. It is highly probable that the rate of pumping was not constant 
and that it was considerably higher. In view of the possibility of th� 
generation of a charge of static electricity either from the delivery pipe 
from the top of the lalll or from the decrease in cross sectional area of the 
J 0 mch pipe line to the 6 inch pipe line. it appeared quite probable that 
charges of static electricity were being buill up in the oil. The relative 
humidity of the atmo:,phere at the time was 80 per cent. (See Appendix 3). 
and this would not preclude the build up o[ a static charge. Hyett 'V3S 
using a steel dip tape filled with a hea\} 4 IIlch brass weight which it was 
customary to I wcr to the bottom of the tank. The tape was enclosed in 
a leather case. I t is therefore quite possible for the steel dip tape to take 
up a charge of statiC electricity from the oil in the tank. and to discharge 
by means of a spark a£ainsl the edge of the 10 inch manhole in the top of 
the tan).. through which the dip tape was insened. In order that this and 
other POints should be Investigated thoroughly. arrangements were made 
with Mr. Swann. H.M Senior Electrical Inspector o[ Factories. for member:-. 
of his �taff to carry out .. In Investigation al the depot. This has been done and 
the reports of 1r Elllolt. H.M. Electrical Inspector of Factories. and an 
exlr:h."'1 from a memorandum by Mr. Leighton. H.M Electrical Jnspector of 
F..Ictories. Jre contained in AppendiJl: 5. 
The result of thi., IIlvestigation shows that Ignition from stray earth 
currents. or fault current or leakage from the electrical inslaUation can be 
disregarded. 
I di�cussed Mr, E.lliolt\ report with him .:md Mr. Sw,mn. and in vie" of 
the evidence furnished by three witne� that Hyett had been diPPlllg the 
lank with a �teel dip tape. they agreed with me that the more probable 
cau,e of ignition wa� electrical sparking [ram the dip tapc 10 the cowr of 
the tank. 
CONCLUSIONS 
\her taking all the facb mto considerallon. and in the absence of J.ny 
eVidence to the contrary. I am of the opinion that the explosion was caused 
by the presence of motor spirit in the gas oil pumped by the tanker ., Fort 
Christina" into shore tank No. 13, and the motor spirit vapour present in 
shore (:mk No. J3 mal hal'c been ignited by a spark caused b) the generaCion 
of a charge of static eledricity in pumping the oil into that tank. or by .he 
presence of glowing iron sulphide in the tank 13. and of th� two possible 
causes the former is the more probable. 
RECOMMENDA nONS 
Bigh flash point products 
1. In view of lhe construction o[ certain war time tankers (T2 Type) 
whereby the products carried. in them may become contaminated owing to 
leaking bulkheads, or faulty valves in the header attached to the pumps. 
it is desirable that the same precautions should be observed in dealing with 
petroleum product� hnving a flash point of 73 F. and upwards as those for 
petroleum spirit (flash point below 73< F.). 
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Where the tankers are provided with separate pumps and pipe lines which 
are not inler-connected. and the products are separated in the tanker by 
double bulkheads, and also where separate product pipe lines are provided 
at the shore installations. tbis may not be necessary provided that there is 
no contamination with tbe previous cargo carried in tbe tanker. There is. 
however. always the danger of contamination owing to an accident of some 
kind. 
This point should also be covered in the licensing of the premises con­
cerned. 
Waler Supplies 
2. It is quite clear that the water supplies available were insufficient as there 
was not enough water 10 cool all tbe tanks near the fire quite apart from 
supplying foam for extinguishing tbe .fire. At ODe time an urgent request 
was sent OUt to cul down the cooling of tanks in order to provide watcr for 
fire fighting. Shell-Mex and RP. had to stop cooling their tanks at the 
Abandan site so as to divert cooling water for the tanks at the Cleveland 
Company's Depot. In fact there was not sufficient water available until 
about It hours after the fire occurred and t.be additional water was obtained 
by pumping water from tbe dock by the Fire Brigade. It is important that 
there should be adequate supplies of water regularly available both for 
cooling purposes and also for fire fighting. 
I would therefore suggest that if practicable a ring main round the petroleum 
depots should be provided. and that this main should be so energised that 
an adequate supply of water is always available. and at Cl sufiicient pressure 
to be used for efficient fire fighting with foam (about 150·l60 lb. per square 
inch). Each tank should be provided witb water nozzles for cooling purposes 
so tbat cooling can be applied at sbort notice. 
Coal fired locomoth'cs 
3. Although tbere is no suggestion that this fire was caused by a spark from 
a locomotive in the vicinity of the depot. it is of importance that coal fired 
locomotives should not be allowed in the vicinity of the depots where 
petroleum spirit is kept. I was informed tbat a number of grass fires have 
occurred due to sparks or bot ashes, and it is important tbat this type of 
locomotive should be replaced by the diesel type. 
Bonding of tank £arm 
4. The fire started at tank No. 13 and this was one of twelve tanks situated 
in a reinforced concrete bund. The fire spread to or damaged all the other 
tanks in the compound. There was a general conHagration in tbe bund 
and motor spirit was fed into the bund from a number of tanks. The heat 
to which the reinforced bund wall was exposed caused the wall to spal!. 
and it was exceedingly fortunate tbat burning petroleum did not find its 
way on to tbe river Severn. This might have proved very serious as the 
bund was only a few feet from the river. I consider that this method of 
bunding is insufficient and that tbis should be suitably improved by providing 
some kind of heat insulation. as for instance, by the addition of earth bunding 
on tbe inside of the reinforced concrete wall. always provided that the wall 
is made sufficiently strong. 
Bunding of tanks 
5. Tbere were in effect twelve separate tanks in one bund and I consider 
that this number of tanks is too large to have in one risk. 11 is true that in 
some cases at Avonmouth dwarf walls were erected between tanks. but 
these are useless unless they are imperforate. This was the case in the bund 
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adJolnmg the one In which the flre occurred. The hole� In the�c dwarf 
w.llls. through which the pipe lines were carried were not sealed. and i f  
leakage occurred from one tank the liquid could run through the dwarf wall. 
I comider from a safcty point of view that wherever practicable each tank 
of any size should be situated in its own Imperforate bund so that 10 the evcOl 
of a fire occurnng the fire can be localised. The neighbouring tanks can then 
be cooled and If it is not possible to extinguish the fire easily It could. at the 
worst, burn Itself out and not affect the remaining tanks. If separate bunds 
are pro\-ided 11 gIves time to close the vahes or do anylhmg else tbat may be 
nece\'!Iary 10 the adJaccOl tanks. The ,"Ier·bund walls should be nearl) as 
high a ... the external bund wall. Each compound should be drained through 
an IIlten.:epter. and thh, should be controlled outside the bund. In this case. 
had Tank No. 2 been blinded separately it is highly probable that the suction 
vahc would have been closed as SOon a., the fire occurred. 
Product pipe lines within the bund 
6. fhe product pipe lines within the bund runnmg beside the tanks Nos. I ,  
2. , and 4 were all fractured as a resuh of the flIe. If  I t  IS necessary or 
deSirable for the pipe lines to be within the bund then I recommend thal they 
�hould be enclosed in a brick or concrete chamber covered with concrete 
\Iabs to protect them from tire. Alternatively the pipe line should be placed 
outside lhe bund 
Spacing of tanks 
7. The fire spread from lank l\o. 1 3  to lank 0. 5 ,"cry rapidly_ and thl:' \lo a.'!! 
probably due to the explosion In tank 0. 1 3  fracturing the 6 inch connection 
10 the top of this tan� through which oil was being pumped and the delay in 
Slopping oil being pumped from the ship through lhl� pipe. Consequentl) a 
certain amount of burnlOg od may have been sprayed IOtO the compound and 
on to lank No. 5. The other tanks were probably invohcd due to the presence 
or burning oil and Spirit 10 the compound In spite of thIS it appears to me to 
be desirable to Increase the dlsLance bet\\cen the tan�s 111 order to prevent the 
heating of the tanks bi' radiation JI\ the event of a fire in  one of them. It  
may be difficult to i ncrea'lc the separation in some cases. but wherever this 
is practicable the ideal distance i� onc diameter apart. or a� near this figure 
as is practicable. 
Filling pipe carried to the bottom of Ihe rank 
8. The filllllg pipe in IJnk No. I 3  was not carried down to the bottom of the 
tan� a ... wa .. done in the case of those tank3 used for the torage of petroleum 
spirit. 1 his is  quite understandable in the case of ga ... oil. 3\ any electric 
discharge due to electrification of tbe oil would have no harmful effect owing 
to the high nash pOinl of this product. I n  \ iew, however. of the possibilit) 
of contamination wllh low nash products mentioned in  recommendation No. I 
of this report. It would be a wise precaution to use bOllOOl delivery and to 
incorporate a non-return \ah,e " ith the deliver) \ alve. This would prc\ent 
burning oil being projcl.:led mto the bund 111 the event of an explosion in the 
tank 
Dipping from the 101) of lanks 
9. Dipping tanks of g�ts oil from the roof or the tank would not normally 
constitute a hazard. but in view of this accident and particularly during pump­
ing operation� it would be a wise precaution to dispense with this method of 
dClcrm1lllllg the level of the liquid in the tank. and use instead a float or 
some other safe device 10 indicate the le\cl of the liquid in the tank. 
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Local first-aid fire fighting 
10. It  is quite clear that the extent of a petroleum fire depends very much 011 
what can be done i n  fighting the fire during the very early stages. namely, the 
first 5 or 10 minutes before the arrival of the Fire Brigade. h. therefore. 
seemed to me that it  would be advisable to initiate a scheme whereby the 
licencees In Avonmouth Dock would organise amongst themselves a first-aid 
fire party to fight a fire which might occur in an}r of the premises o[ the 
Companlc.!. concerned. Accordingly, J approach the [ollowing firms with this 
end in view : -
Watsons Petroleum Co. Ltd., Cleveland Petroleum Co . Regent Oil Co 
Ltd., Shell·Mex & B.I'. Lld., Esso Petroleum Co. Lld., New Western 
Oil SIorage, Ltd., Wm. BUller & Co. (Bristol) Ltd. 
These firms have agreed in principle to work out a scheme among themselves 
in order to train their personnel in fire fighting, have regular prilctices and 
pool their fire-fighting resources for first aid action. They point out however 
that during non-workll1g t ime, i.e., week-ends. holidays and nights, the number 
of men available would be considerably reduced. and in the event of an 
accident they would probabl) be [ully employed in taking preventive action. 
such as closing valves, etc., but they would do what they could. In Ihese 
circumstances, therefore, I would recommend that during the non-working 
hours. if possible, some additional members o[ Ibe fire brigade should be 
transferred to the Docks to deal wilh an outbreak of fire during tbese 
periods. It would also be necessary to introduce some means of rapid com­
munication between the various depots so that in tbe event of a fire or explo­
sion occurring no time would be lost i n  sending the necessary information 
as to the location. tbe number o[ men and equipment required. The telephone 
service IS not considered to be satisfactory for tbis purpose 
Application of foam to storage tanks 
1 1 . The question of whether bottom injection of foam or top foam pourers 
should be used for the extinction of a fire in a tank cOl1uailling petroleum 
spirit is a matter of opinion and has yet to be decided. In the case of 
some tanks at Avonmouth. some were fitted with bottom injection pipes. but 
some of these pipe connections were situated inside the bund so that. 
if they were to be used it would be necessary tu go into the bund to connect 
up and open the suction valves if they were closed. Thus. if the fire wa .... 
burning in the bund, some of the connections could nol be made and the valve, 
could not be opened. 
Whichever system is used it is absolutely essential that the connectlOIl'i 
for the application of foam. by bottom injection or througb dry risers to 
the top of the tank. should be external to the bund in an easily accessible 
posilion and several feel away from the bund to enable the mobile foam 
units to be connected up 10 the tank without being subjected to an undue 
amount of heat. If the bottom injection system is used then a suitable 
non·return valve should be fitted on the tank side of the suction valve, ;,tnd 
the suction valve should be left open. otherwise it  may not be possible to inject 
any foam into the tank. 
If top pourers are Installed. tbis should not necessarily be limited to one 
point but two or possibly three. 
I recommend that the connections [or the applicaLion of foam should be! 
external to the bund in an easily accessible position away from the bund 
wall, and if bottom injection is used a suitable non-return valve should be 
fitted on the tankside of the suction valve and thal the sllction valve should 
be kepI open. 
1 5  
OBSERVATIONS 
( I )  On the 291h May. 1 940. a circular leuef was sent from the Home 
Office to the hicf Officers of local fire brigades regarding fires al large oil 
depots. A copy of Ihi.., lellef is attached in Appendi, 6. 
This arrangement or a modification of il should be continued In the ca.!)c 
of oil depots a� I t  is obvious that the depot manager will know exact I} 
Whi.1t the conditiom are in the variou tanks, namely whether they arc full 
or empty and what the risks are in his own depot. In view of this it  is 
important that tbe depot manager and the chief officer of the fire brigade 
should consult together in fightmg a fire jn the depot 
(2)  A copy of the licence issued by the local authority is contained in 
Appendi� 7. The licences issued to the occupiers of the other depots in 
AvonmOUlh Dock have been examined and they are all in the same form 
It  appears to me that the local authority carry out their duties under the 
Petroleum (Consolidation) Act 1 928 in a somewhat perfunctory manner. 
I n  conclusion I would express my thanks 10 Mr. Swann. O.B.E .• H.M. 
SenIor Electrical In.l.pcctor of Factones. Mr. Elliott. H.M. Electrical I nspector 
of Factories. Major J .  C. Hunt. M.B.E . .  Headquarters. Bomb Disposal Unil 
( . K . ), War Office. Mr. Butlin. Chemical Research Laboratory. Teddington. 
the DIrector of the Meteorological Office. Messrs. D. \V. Gelling and A. H. 
Wilson. Senior Engineer Surveyors. Ministry of Transport. and Mr. Frost. 
Regent Od Company . for the assistance they have rendered me in carrying 
DlIl my Inquir}. 
I h3\c the honour 10 be. Sir. 
Your obedIent Servant. 
H. E. WAn"S. 
H.l\1 ChIef Inspector of E'plosive ...  
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APPENDIX 2A 
REGENT OIL COMPANY LTD. 
LABORATORY REPORT 
Laboratory. CE.1\.! kAL. 
Report Vo.,  c.L. 5 1 58 B Van 5 1 .  
Sample Vo. ·  K. 8010. 
Date: 2nd October. 195 1 .  
Reference: 
DOl:! Recell'cd: 17th September, 1 95 1 .  
Na/llre of Sample: MOlor Spim contaminated ex A\onmouth lost. Ship's (anI-. 
No. 8 starboard. BID " Fort Christina " DID 5th September, 
195 1 . Depot S/No. AV ./F/14. ( I -gin) . 




. . . 
Reid Vapour Pressure (lbs.) 
Existent Gum (mgflOO mls. ), 
0 · 7347 
Clear 
Orange 
8 · 5 
1 ,700 approx. 
Gum (mgllOO rnls.) urler extraction 
",ith I.P. spirit 1 · 6 
Corrosi\e Sulphur (I.P. 65) 
Corrosion (Cu Strip) 
t-reezing Point ( C.)  . .  
Bromine Value 
Aniline-Gravity COnSl3nl 
Water Tolerance (ml".) 
Lead Tctraethyl (mI.lI .O.) 
Aromatics ( %  \01.)  . . .  
Total Sulphur (°·0 wt.) 
No change 
• 
· . . 24 
. . . 
I 03 
· . . 
· . . . . .  O·  I 2 
.:..-.:...----
DISTILLATION ( I . P.) 
Barometer · . .  763 mms. 
Temperature 1 8  C. 
I.B.P. 40 
5 °� ;.a . • •  57 
10�0 @ ..  64 
20° 
° 
@ . . .  75 5 
30% <!t . . · · . .  88 
40% (g. . .  107 
50% @. .  1 20 · 5  
60% @; .. 1 3 3 · 5  
70°" � . · . 148 
80 �o @. ...  162 
9O�o � . .  200 
95% @ . . .  279 ' 5  
F.B.P. . . .  288 
Recovery 97 .0 °0 
Residue . . .  I . 5 ° • 
Loss · . I 5 ·  • 
% E\iap. (a 70 C. 1 5 '0�0 
% Evap. � 1 25 C. 52' 5 %  
% Evap. Ca) 180°C. 88 ' 0 %  
% Evap. @' 




% Evap. @) 
19 Corr. Temp. C. 
23 · 0  U. 
Octane umber (Res. "" . 1 . )  70· 3 (Motor F .2.) . . . . . .  65 · 7  
( Rich Mixture F.4.) 
RE..,,"RKs ;-The octane number (F.2.) is below specification. The existent gum of 
1 ,700 mgms./lOO mts. approximately is oily material. The % Evap. @ 
ISO"C. is below specification. The F.B.P. is above specification. This 
sample is obviously contaminated with gas oil. 
RS CMR. 
cc. Tech. Dill, 
Bulk S &. S. 
A,·onmoulh. 
1 7  
Prepared by: G. MAYHEW. 
Siglled hy: R. SFrTON. 
LotxJ/tlforJ'. Cl ... I RAL. 
APPENDIX 28 
REGENT OIL COMPA N Y  LTD. 
LABORATORY REPORT 
Da/�: 25th September, 1951.  
Report No.:  CL. 5 1 27, B. Van 5 1 .  Refere1lce: 
Sample Vo. K 8012. Date ReC€H'ed 1 7th September, 195 1 .  
Varure 01 Sample.' (Normal) Motor Spirit ex Avonmouth Inst. Ship's average Tks. 
r.es. Nos. 1 -7. .. Fort Chrislina ,. Loading pon Bahrein. 
D D  5th September, 195 1 .  Depot S No. AV Fd6. ( I  GaU.). 
SJ)t..�ific (jrav lly 1/1 60 F. 
Appearance . .  . . . 
Colour 
Odour 
Rcid Vapour Pre�surc (Ibs.) 
Existent Gum (mg 1 00  mls.) 





0 · 8  
DI TI LLATION ( I .P.) 
Barometer 
Temperature 
I . B.f> 
5 �-;, ,I' 
l Oo� " . . 
20�D (� • 
30� 0 IU 40°'0 la 
5000 la 
6000 III 
70 o� la . . 
80�'� 'a 
9O�o tu 




. . .  
756·6 
mms. 
1 3 ' 5  C. 






1 10· 5 
123 ·0 
1 36'0 
148 ' 5  
164·  5 
Gum, Lead Precipllrnc (mc, 100 rnls.) 
Corrosi .. c Sulphur (LP. 65) 
Corrosion ( u Strip) Q 122 F. 
Freezing Point ( C) 
No change 
95 °10 la 179·0 
F.B.P 192·0 
Bromine Value 25 
Aniline-Gravity COllstant 
Watcr Tolerance (11115.) 
Lead Tetr3cthyl (ml. J .G_) . . .  I ·  25 
Aromatics (0'-;; \01.) . . 
Total Sulphur ( 0.;,  "'t ) 0·06 
Octane Number (Res. F . J .) . .  . . .  74.5 
( R ich Mixture F.4.) 
RecOvery 98-0" Q 
Residue I . ., "/ . . . - " . 
Loss . . .  0' 8 °-11 
• 
o E\ap. ,il 70 C. 20·8io o� Evap. (a' 1 25 C. 62 ' 8 %  
o� Evap. @ 180 C. 96· 3 "0 
�� Evap. ((I) �� EV;Jp. 'a 
"� E\ ap. IQ 
Corr. Temp. C. 1 5 ' 5  
28·0 U 
( Motor F.2.) 69· 7  
REMARI\.S:-The Octane Number (F.2.) is slightly 0010\>, specification. 
RS DAIS. 
c.c. Ted,. DII'. 
Bulk S &. S. 
AI'Olm/Ollt". 
18 
Prepared bl': G. MAYUEw. 
Siglled b)': R, SEfTON. 
APPENDIX 3 
III reply piellse quofe : 
M .  55 1 8 / 5 1 .  
DEAR SIR. 




17th September, 1951 .  
In reply to your letter of 12th September, I forward herewith a copy of a 
report (rom the J\'leteorological Office at the Royal Air Force station, FiJIan. 
which IS the nearest place to Avonmouth from which information is available. 
As regards item ( I )  of your enquiry the practice at our observing stations. 
is 10 read the dry and wet bulb thermometers a few minutes before each exact 
hour. The dry bulb gives the shade temperature and the humidity is computed 
from the readings of the two thermometers. On the occasion in question, the 
thermometers were read within a minute or two of 2.47 p.Ol. In addition the 
maximum temperature during the " day " period 06h.·18h. G.M.T. (7 a.m.·7 p.m. 
summer time) is read on a self·registering thermometer and the value for 6th 
September is given as item (4) of the report. No readings of ,. sun " temperatures 
are made at our stations. 
Some further information is included 10 Item (5) of the report, from which 
you will sce that the sky was overcast at the time and the wind light northerly. 
As regards electrical disturbances, we ma}' amplify the " nil " report from 
Filton by stating that none of our stations reported thunder or lightning dunng 
the afternoon of 6th September, and nooe nearer than the English Channel 
were detected by our ,. Sfcric " direction finders, the special function of which 
is to detect and locate thundery outbreaks. 
H.M. Chief Inspector 0/ Explosives, 
Room 420. Home Office, Whitehall. S.W. I .  
(Copy.) 





(Signed) E. L. HILHA\1. 
Enclosure to A ppe"dix 3 
M ETEOROLOGICAL OFFICE. 
ROYAL AIR FORCE. 
FILTON. 
BRISTOL 
14/h September, 1951 .  
Observations al Filton, 2.47 p.RI. 8.S.T. OR 6th SeptelUber. I!JSI 
In accordance with the telephone request of Mr. Bilham. this morning. the 
following is the information required : -
I ,  Dry bulb temperature-69 degrees Fahr. 
2. Relative Humidity-SO per cent. 
3. Electrical disturbances-Nil. 
4. Maximum day temperature during period 0600h·l SOOb O.M.T.-71 degrees 
Fahr. 
19 
5. {a) Sunshme recorder reading-NIl. 
(b) Total amount of cloud-8/8ths. 
Cc) Surface " Ind-North 6 miles per hour, 
(S'gned) J.  V. JONES. 
Cop)" 10 S. Mel. 0U,ar. for Meteorological Officer I/C, 
GlnlluSft!r. for i"formaf;o!J 
APPENDIX 4 
S \MPLE FRO,') PETROL STORAGE TA KS (AVONMOUTH) Oes<'riplion of samples 
The samples (in Winchester quart bottles) were taken on 17th September, 1951,  from lank� at Avonmouth North Installation (Regent Oil Company, Limited). 
From Tank 30 
( I )  ISI Drmv-oD. Yellow ltqllld with black deposIt. The latter evolved COPIOUS H.S when treated wllh dilute acid and consisted probably mostly of ferrous sulphIde. The presence of ferrous sulphIde sugge",ls that sulphate-reducing bacteria had been active. (2) 2nd Draw-oD. Yellow liqUid with rusty deposit, No sulphide detected. 
From flmk 18 
( I )  ISI Draw-oD. Mostly oil but With aboUl I Inch of water with rusty depoSIt. o sulphide. 
(2) 2nd Draw,oD. Yellow liquid "Ith darkish depoSIt. No SUlphide. 
E\:lIminrllion for pr�encc of sulphate-reducing bacteria I ml quantltle� of each sample were placed in 2 oz. bottles. \\ hich were tben completely filled "tth a sulphate-lactate medium contalrung some ferrous salt. They \.\-ere then stoppered. sealed and Incubated at 30· C. The presence o[ viable non-halophIlic" sulphate-reducmg bacteria would have been sho"n b) blackening of the mcdJUm, due 10 the [ormatlon of ferrous SUlphide. After Onc month's incuballon no blackenmg had occurred and it can be assllmed that nonc of the I ml. samples contained non-halophtlic sulphate­reducers. It is poSSible that blackening might have occurred if larger quantities (> I ml.) had been Incubated. The results show Ihat very fe". less than I cell ml.. were present. 
These result� were surprtsmg. because the presence of a deposit of ferrous sulphide In Ihe 1st Draw-off sample from Tank 30 strongly suggested that the organlsm� had been active in this tank. It was thought possible. however, that the organisms might be of the halophilic type. i,e., they might grow only in a medium containing 2-3 per cent. NaCI in addition to the other necessary nutrients (Iacate, sulphate, etc.). 
Accordingly I ml. of each sample was incubated anaerobically (similarly 10 the first series) wllh .\ sulphate-lactate medium containing 2-3 per cenl. Nae!. No blackening occurred after one month's incubatton with the samples taken from Tank 18. 
Blackenlllg occurred after eight days 10 the two samples taken from Tank 30. �hcroscopjcal examination showed that an almosl pure culture of sulphate­redUCing bacteria had developed. 
These results demonstrate the presence of halophilic strains of stllphale-reducmg bacteria in the \\;).Ier in Tank 30. They explain the presence of ferrous SUlphide In Ihe 1st Draw·off sample and suggest that the Source of sulphate�reducing bacteria was sea-water. 
Clremicll/ Rl'st'arc/t Laboratory. 
291h Nm·('mber. 1951 .  
(Sgd.) K. R. BunIN. 
-----:----;-:-;---:-;--.. Halophilic (suit-lOVing) organrsms are I ho�e \\h ich on ly grow In  salt wJ.ter, ('.g .• sea wutor, $..'\llI'e lakes. 
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Dr. Walls. 
A PPENDIX 5 
GROSVENOR GARDENS House, 
GROSVENOR GARDENS, 
S.W. I .  
3rd Oerober, 1951 .  
i\vonmoulh Oil Fire 
I send with this the lOp copy of Mr. Elliott's report of his investigatIOn 
between 18th and 20th September. (Enclosure I . ), 
A lot of data of a useful character IS given aDd It seems to me that the 
question of an IflCCndlVe sialic spark turns on two main condltions : -
( I )  The filling pipe was not taken down to the bottom of the storage tank, 
and 
(2) The tank in which the fire origmated was nOI fabricated and welded, 
but the mdividual plales were secured by rivets or bolted construction. 
The significance of point ( 1 )  lies in the fact that there would be a considerable 
gush of 011. dropplOg at first the full height of the tank and thus more likely 
10 produce those features of turbulence and evaporation whIch are associated 
with the generation of static electricity. 
POlOt (2) needs a httle elaboration, because i t  leads 10 the possiblhty of a 
section o[ steelwork being isolated electrically by reason of the material used 
for making the joints or even by oxide film. 
Mr. Elliott made some tests for electrostatic charges using an instrument 
which has just been put on the market as a result of work done in the research 
laboratoCles of the Dunlop Rubber Co., Birmingham. This instrument IS capable 
of quanlltative measurement and be found that a similar gas oil to that bemg 
pumped mto the tank whIch exploded was capable of electnficatlOn even m 
small quantities. 
There seems, therefore, 10 be some reasonable ground for assuming internal 
e!eclrification in this tank at a time when there may have been sufficient petrol 
contamination to form an explosive mixture in the air space above the level to 
which the tank had been filled. 
Mr. Elliott is inclined to visualise incendlve sparking between areas of dIfferent 
potential in much the same way as a flash of lightning takes place between 
clouds. There is literature which suppor!s thIS view, e.g. U.S. Bureau of Mmes. 
Bulletm 368. 1 939. It IS also possible that there could be mOIsture included m 
the gas oil which might have some effect in the accumulation of the stallc 
charges. 
The possibility of a steel plate being electrically isolated in the neighbourhood 
of electrified areas might lead to sparking over joints above oil level. and thus 
point (2) may be of some importance. 
You will see that the conditions for an incendive spark are not the same as 
those which existed in the Glyco Petroleum case. 1n tbis latter instance the 
supply, or filling, pipe was not in contact wIth the metalwork of the tank, but 
at Avonmouth it was welded to the top structure. Again at Glyco this ClslOg 
malO to the filler aperlUre was electrically discontinuous by reason of insulating 
material used at the flange joints between the centrifugal pump and the discharge. 
I took the view, as you will remember at that time, that this could lead to the 
piling up of voltage between each successive flange and finally bet'Ween the pipe 
and the structure of the tank. The final spark would then be expected at the 
place where the down pipe entered the manhole, which also happened to be 
the point at which the mixture with air would be the most likely to explode. 
]( incendlve sparking were possible at Avonmoutb It might be between an 
isolated section of Ihe plating of the lank or between the different areas of the 
static ID the oil. J am not sure how far this latter theory can be taken but 
Mr. Gilchrist, with whom Mr. ElJiott had an interesting discussion, is a London 
21 
Officer of Ihe Rcgent Co., and It  mIght be possible 10 rig up a small scale 
edlllon of the Avonmouth tank at their Balter�ea Depot and take some further 
readings "Ith the new Instrument under condlllons of msulahon and earthmg 
which �lr, EllJolt would be prepared 10 speclfv. 
After you have read hiS report and Ihis covenng nOle. you might hke to 
haH a lalk about this or any othcr pOint which seems to arise on the report. 
(Sgd.) H W. WANr-.. 
"'lOll' Med"'N uit" Mr Su·allll and Mr. £lIiofl on 29,11 Ocwber, 1 95 1  
I pOinted out that eVidence regardmg the dipper was not complete -is three 
\\'Itnesse� had loeen Hyeu dlPpmg shore tank o. 13.  In view of thiS additional 
evidence both t\lr Swann and �·Ir. Elliott agreed that [he more probable cause 
of IgOltlon "as sparkmg from the dlPpmg [ape 10 the cover of the lank. 
(Sgd l H E. W \1T'. 
APPENDIX 5 E"clOSf/re I 
FIRE A r O I L  s roRAGE DEI'OT OF REGENT OIL CO. LTD .• 
A VONMOUTH DOCK 
Inve!Jl lgiltlon made on 1 8th. 19th and 20th ')eptember, 195 1  
In·u\lc"ed 
\if lIi1ng'A-onh, AS!>I Depot Supenntendenl. Regent 011 Co .. Lld 
\tf Gilchrist, Senior Electrical Engineer, Regenl 011 Co .. LIJ 
\1r. Roi>trls. Ass!. Electrical Engineer, Regent Oil Co .. Ltd 
\1r. I egg. Engineer. Regent Oil 0 .. Lld 
\1 r Phllhps. Substation Engineer, Port of Bristol Authority 
\iainlenancc Electric!:ln. rort of Bristol Authority. 
Gene ...... ' 
The fire occurred III the walled compound which was the ongmal storage 
mstallilllun dilL! "h leh ha!> $lIlce been extended by the addition of other com­
pounds, one ,ll each end and one on one side (see Fig. I ). The fire 10 [his 
compound de1olrO)ed or damaged almost everythmg \\.Ithm It. but by virtue of 
lhe wall, good worl on the part of the Fire Bngade and good fortune with 
the Winds, was preventt..-d from extend 109 to the remalOdcr of [he IOslallatlon. 
Tanks Nos. 1 3  and 1 4  amongst others are used for gas oil and No. 1 3  was 
bems filled when the explosion and subsequent fire occurred. This fire then 
extended to the rem3mder of the tanks withlO the compound. Tanks 1 3  I:I.nd 
1 4  are each ,lppro\.lmately 20 ft. diameter and 1 7  ft. 6 In. hJgb and hold when 
full roughly 1 20 tons of gas 011. Tanl No. 1 3  was being filled with od from a 
lanler through a 1 0  in. delivery line some 3.000 fl. long from the ship. At 
2.30 p.m. on the da) o[ the fire Tank o. 1 3  was at about 5 ft. level. At 
about 2A7 p.m the tanl was very rOllghly at about 1 5  ft. level and Iwo men. 
u dipper and a sampler, were sent to take the level and sample the oil. The 
dipper was on the top of the tank and the sampler was on the ladder on his 
Wa) up when the c\.ploslon occurred. Both men were killed. 
The rate of pumpmg IS high. the turbulence and aerallon are great. and as 
the delivery pipe mto Ihe lOp of the tank projects onJy about 6 in. to 1 fl. 
helo\\. the lank roof there would be a heavy stream of ot! at first faUmg some 
1 2  ft. and a.s the tank reached the 1 5  ft. level. failing some 2 ft. 6 10. to 3 ft. 
BeSides the del iver) pipe 1010 the top of the tan}.. there IS a 10 m. manhole. 
which wa� opcn. a vcnt pipe of about 6 Ill. dJ3meter and a dipping orifice of 
about the same diameter. 
On the Ship, the gas 011 was carried in J. tank adjacent 10 a lank contaiDlng 
spITIl and Ihe ship's Captain had reported some contamination of the gas 
011 by splnt. Mr. IIhngworth "aid that a first flow had been run into anolher 
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bad been drawn and sampled he was satisfied Ihat the flash·polOl was correct 
and ommenced filling Tank No. J 3  with gas oil which he did not consider 
was then contaminated. There was some talk also of the possible contents of ... 
branch In the delivery Ime near the slup and some question as to whether thiS 
might have contamed Spirit, and J heard a workman say that be had since 
secn thiS branch to conlam sludge. ThiS IS only a rough outline for general 
descnptlon and was not further Invcstlgated as It was plam that Dr. Watts 
was goms fully 1010 these matters and obtalOmg various samples of gas 011. 
It IS. h01,l,ever, Important 10 that It Indicates the possibility of spirit vapour 
10 the space above the oil ID the lank at the lime of the accident. Mr. 
IIhngworLh said that the general air temperature at the time wa�. he believed, 
about 60 F. but 10 hiS opmlOn the lOp of the tank might have been as high 
as 80 F. 
Where light SPlflts such as petrol are stored m bulk, an Important factor, 
If not the most Important factor, ID mhlblllng Igmlion due to sIalic discharges 
IS undoubtedly the fact that the space above the spirit IS too nch. It may well 
be that a relatively small contamlOatlon of gas oil by SPlflt, sllch as to result 
to an mflammable mixture, presents a far greater fISk than that In storage tanks 
[or SPITll, demandlOg an attention to mlOimlsmg of fisk which was not given 
In thiS case. 
This aspect may prOVide the c\planatlon of the previous Immumt� of the 
gas oil storage tanks 111 the installation. and account for the fact that Tanks 
1 3  and 14 have been In use some 1 5  years. and must have been filled, according 
to Mr. IlIlngworth, some hundreds of limes . 
. ]\.1 r. Roberts said that although the dipper was on tbe tanl It was loo",n 
that he had not commenccd dipping because the steel tape used for the operation 
was found blown m one direction and the brass weigbt, as yet unco.3ted With 
water paste, was found blown in the other direction. Also the tape and weight 
carned by the sampler were found. showing that neither of these had been 
Inserted IOtO the tank. It appears therefore that, as far as the evidence which I 
was able to gather IS concerned, onc must assume spontaneous Ignition Without 
action on the part of the men concerned-in any case my IOvesllgation� were 
based upon that being <:;0. 
Standard or EI«lricnl Maintenance 
The degree of competence ma) be desCribed .);5 that \\ hlCh IS general to 
industnal mstallauons and which falls short of our requHt:ments from the 
electrical safety POint of view and apart from the special Tlsks here IOvolvOO. 
Lack of a resident en,QlOeer on the job was also apparent in that Mr. Roberts 
was not so familiar with the details of switchgear as we should consider necessdry 
for m(untenance purposes. As regards tests. Mr. Roberts said : -
(a) As far as he loe .... tests were not regularly made (nor had ever been) 
regardmg the pOSSible presence of stallc electriclt) in these Diesel oil lanl�. 
(h) Tests were not made on the following : ­
(i) Electrical continuity of Oil piping. 
(iil ContinUity between motor frames and cable armour and she.llhmg. 
(ill) ContlOulty of cable armour and sheathmg. 
(jv) Earth return Circuit from neutral conductor to malO earth connection 
(loop test). 
(v) Test. tndlcBtlon or recording of eanh leakage currents. 
At six·monthly intervals an insulation resistance test is taken on electric motors 
separately. the malO cables sepa�ately. the sub·mams separately and finally sub­
CIrCUits, and any of these are rejected If below I megohm. 
It may also be noted that the main sWllchgear and office sWltchgear. all within 
a danger area (the malO switchgear is within about 20 yards of a road tank 
car.loadlng gantry) are mostly not of cer!ifie� f1a�ep�oof. construction. The 
malO clrcuit·breaker is not flameproof. lighting dlstTlbutlOn board� are not 
• See my note of 291h Oclober. 19$1 10 Appendix S. 
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certlried flameproof and these are In a brick shed wllh galvanised Iron doors. 
openmg ioto the space where road car loadmg is done. In the office Itselr. 
the hghtmg sWllches are of .. gas tight ,
. 
construction. The reason [or this. 
Mr. Roberts said, was thdt they were installed at about 1930 before certified 
flameproof gear was available and they had nOI been changed since. 
In addition the level of knowledge regardlOg the precautions 10 be laken on 
static risks was not of a high order. 
Electrical Continuily of Oil Pipework 
These two tanks Sit on a hard core base above which IS placed a la}er of 
sand. ).Ir. Roberts said he had on one occasion measured the reSistance of a 
tank to earth before Its plpework had been connected and had found 0.2 ohm. 
It happens that I obtained this same figu_re between the remains of Tank No. 13 
and the pipework system generally. though, having regard to tbe flooding of 
the compound by the Fire Brigade and the masses of pipework wreckage present 
when my test was made. the figure is of little value. 
I made a number of lests on Ihe general continuity of the pipe system 
and It should be understood that this system within the compound was very 
much more dense at the time of the accident than at the time of my mvesllga­
tlon, because a very large number of heavy pipes flowing through the com­
pound have been broken liP. distorted and made fuUy discontin.uolls as a result 
of the fire. Even so, the heavy pipework is so extensive that in my view it 
conStitutes a solid earth electrode capable of carrying all fault currents likely 
to be met on this installation. It is not mtentionally connected to the water 
pipe system of the docks and although it no doubt in fact forms a solid earth 
With the water pipe system. good practice would have dictated that sllch a 
permanent connection shollld also have been made. Results of tests in this 
connection are given in Enclosure l A. 
Continuity of Electrical S}Slem and O"erload Protective Apparatus 
The electrical continUity of the Regent 011 Co. main switchgear and heavy 
pumplOg motors is by lead-covered cables and via a lead-covered cable to 
the sub-station neutral. so that there is a metalliC return to the supply via buried 
cable. In addllion. the Regent 011 Co's main switchgear is, according to Mr. 
R.:Iberts, conn.ected to an earth plate, the details of which he does not know. 
but Ihis may be a plate about 3 ft. square. All pump motors are, however, 
connected solid via the 011 pumps with the main heavy pipe system. Thus 
the earth plate Itself at the Regent Oil Co. plays an insignificant part, and the 
overall continuity is quite exceptionally good. 
Multiple loop tests were made at Regent 011 Co.'s main switcbgear and the 
reSlstances were separated out to give the following results : -
Resistance of supply neutral to earth . . .  0.2 ohm 
Resistance of Regent Oil Co.'s main switchgear frame to 
earth . . ,  0 ohm 
Resistance of the general pipe.work to earth . . .  . . .  . . ,  0.07 ohm 
The loop resistance for the clearance of faulls on the Regent 011 Co.'s main 
motor circuit-breaker is accordingly 0.2 ohm and as the phase to earth voltage 
is 210 volts A.C. the maximum earth fault clearance IS 1050A. The sub· 
station earth electrode is formed by the connection of the neutral point of 
tbe transformer to the lead sheath and armouring of three outgoing medium 
voltage cables (all of considerable length, the cable to the Regent Oil Co. being about 450 yards long) and also to the lead sheath and armourins;: of the high tension 
cable to the substation. Mc. Phillips did not know whether there was an 
earth plate in addition. There had been no faults in any part of the area 00 
the day oC the fire. 
The overload setting of the Regent Oil Co,'s cirCUli-breaker is 900A (time 
element not known), which is just about satisfactory for fault clearance. but 
more Important from the point of view of the investigation of this fire, the 
setting of the substation feeder circuit-breaker is lower, being 440A to tTlP in 
1 0  secs. and this, having regard to the loop resistance and tbe eltceptionaUy 
high current carrying capacity of the earth continuity system. disposes of heavy 
earth fault occurrence as a factor in the causation of Ihe accident. 
2S 
NeIther Mr. Phllllps nor f>v1 r  Roberts were sUItably aware of these detads and figures would have to be obtained from the manufacturers in order to provIde exact data, though thiS IS hardly necessary from the point of vie" of thiS mqulry, Likewise, as regards rupturing capacity, this is Dot koown for either SWilch but the transformer bank IS only 300kVA at 3.2 per cent. Impedan e, so that \\-lIh J potential fault energ) of 1 0  mVA the coodltlons are not onerous. It should be checked for the future. but has no bearing OD 
the fire as It was definitely stated that neither the Regent Oil Co:s breaker nor the substatIon breaker opened at the tIme until tripped by hand. 
Stra} Earth Currenb 
Tests \\-ere made by measuring voltages and currents belv.een vanous pipes 
cables, neutral conneclions. etc, In every case there was complele zero o� 
A, . •  wllh the . exception of between the neutral conductor of the syslem and plpework. ThIS gave 0.37V and 0.5V A.c. m two tesls, is a very good figure 
and does not Involve currents of any degree of danger. On D.C .. minute 
potentia Is and currents could be measured. the latter bemg of the order of 
a few Inllllamps. These are doubtless either electrolytic in  ongin or from a 
known remote D.C plant in the docks and have no signtficance. 
ASSESSMENT 01' POSSIBLE eAU ES OF THE FIRE 
I .  Non-ElC<'trkal 
The Engmeers of Ihe Regent 011 Co. had apparemly conSIdered "hether the 
lank could have burst as a result of too rapid pumpmg. Ihe teJrmg of a metalliC 
filament of a plate at the moment of fracture resulting III Its bemg heated and 
Igniting a vapour 'air nll''(lure. There were, however. the 10" manhole open, 
the normal vent open �nd the dipper onfice open. and this view they have 
accordingly discarded. 
Further allenllon was oot given 10 thiS, as il has no doubt been considered 
by Dr. Watts and IS  non-electrical. 
2. EIe<:lrical Fault Current or uakal:c 
Two possible vari:Hions mal' be conSldered ; -
(a) The lead-covered cable from the Regent 011 Co:s main swilchgeJI" 10 
their mam pump house passes along tbe mSlde of the wall and wltbin a 
few feet of Tank 13, IhlS cable bemg about 2' 6" below ground. Had a 
dead [.Iult occurred on this cable, the question arises whether current in 
sufficienT quantity could have flowed to the tank or its pipework on its 
path back to Ihe general mass of earth and caused sufficicnt local beating 
10 give a hOI metallic spot in the roof of the lank. The general arrangement 
of Ihe plpcwork IS shown m Fig. 2. From thiS sketch il IS seen that Tanks 
1 3  and 1 4  would be electrically III parallel to such a path with [our ways 
of entry or e'(lt. viz .. suction pipe to Tank 13.  suction pipe of Tank 14, 
mlel pipe of Tank 1 3  and mlet pIpe of Tank 14. The 6" mlet pipes arc 
welded 10 the lank roofs and it is considered Ihal the current flow v�a these 
parallel paths such as mighl cause local healmg of metal. would be a current 
greatly In excess of thal �t which either circuit-breaker would clear. More­
over. In the event of a cable fault. there would be a path from the cable 
shealh 10 an exceptionally good earlh on the supply side and an e'(ceptionaJly 
good earth on tbe motor side where the malO pipework system IS also very 
e'«ensive ; thiS is shown diagrammatically in  Fig. 3 and it is not possible 10 
visualise a heavy current flow from Ihe cable sheath into the tank. 
(b) A fault current of smaller magnitude Ihan visualised in (a) above. bur 
persistmg for a conSiderable period. when flowing from a buried cable 
sheath mlo surroundmg soil may sometimes diSSIpate such heat as 10 raise 
the temperature 10 the pomt where water is driven off m vapour fonn. It 
has been conSIdered whclher. flOWIng between the cable sheath and No. 1 3  
or No. 1 4  tank or ItS plpework. such a currenl might so overheat the oil­
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from the top openmgs, blow back. and explode the tank. There are two 
reasons for disposing of this possibility : -
(i) The process IS slow with much evolutIOn of vapour and could not 
have taken place without some visual signs which would have been seen 
by the two men. 
(ii) As in (a) above, the .. solidity " of the general pipe network is such 
thal a sufficient potential would nol be developed between the cable sheath 
,lod tbe tank or pipes as to allow the flow of current necessary for tbe 
dissipation of the kilowatts needed to heat up a volume of some cubIc 
feet of earth and start an all fire. 
Tbe two possibilities (a) and (b) above, presuppose a heavy fault in the cable 
between Regent 011 Co:s main switchgear and their main pump house ; :lIld 
there is, so far, no evidence of such a fault. The cable measured by Mr. 
Roberts and Mr. PhilJips after the event (see Enclosure I (B» was found low 
on insulation test. ThiS is ascribable to the entry of fire brigade water via 
two buried joint boxes when the compound was flooded. A fault in a cable 
which blows Itself clear, although a freak effect. is not entirely unknown and 
for certainty in disposing of these points, Mr. Robcrts was asked to strip the 
faulty section and ex:aminc it with Mc. Leighton. The results of the cullmg 
and testing of this cable are cx:tracted from Mr. Lelghton's Memorandum and 
given in EncloSllre I (B), and the conclUSion is that there was no fault on 
the cable. 
This then completes the investigation as regards fault currenl or leakage 
from the electrical installation. It is considered that this was not the cause of the 
explosion and subsequent tire. 
3. Static Electricity 
The lack of a down tube In the 6" delivery to the tank results in a heavy, 
fast-moving stream (about 18 fcet per second) Issumg via the tank roof. falhng 
through a drop of about 13 feet initial.ly and about 2 to 3 feet finally at 
the moment of the accidenl. Heavy formation. of oil spray, volatilisation of 
any light-spirit contammant, and violent turbulence in the main body of the 
contents arc the accompanying results. Reasons given for the absence of a down 
tube were that the tanks 13 and 1 4  were oflginally installed as a temporary 
expedIent-though they have now been in use for some 1 5  years or so-and 
that although a down tube or swinging arm 15 desirable for light spirits, there 
was no need for it with gas oil; both arguments being fallacious. The forma­
lion of spark discharge in tanks a mere fraction of the size of Tank No. 1 3  
is well enough known and needs no elaboration, nor does the possibiJily of 
ignition by this means, particularly if a light spirit contaminant is found to 
have existed even within the limits acceptable to the Depot. It may be men­
tioned that the roof plate construcion of the tank consisted of treatment of the 
peripheral surface of each tank plate with asbestos pastc before assembly for 
tightness. The tank being temporary the plates arc bolted. having first a lead 
washer and then a steel washer between the plate surface of the nut on each 
side. Tests between plates were not made because results could not be of value 
havmg regard to the heat to which the tank .. ..... ere subjected during the fire 
an.d might give a misleading impression. I suggest, however. that it cannot 
be said that individual plates were necessarily in contact as regards static at 
the time of the accident and if any joints were of high reSLStance, this may have 
played a part by way of sparking between plates, although this process is not 
in any way essential to an explanation of the ignition by reason of statIc 
electricity. As shown above the general mass of the tank was undoubtedly 
al earth potential. There was in each delivery pipe a Vitraulic joint for induclOg 
the necessary flexibility into the delivery pipe, though such a joint does not 
necessarily mean a high value. A typical joint measured m the pump house 
in fact gave zero resislance reading. 
Mr. Roberts said thal it is his practice (and It is undoubtedly a good practice) 
to provide a copper bond across Vitraulic joints where light spirit is used, 
but no such bonds had been provided in these two delivery pipes. 
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As a small�scalc .. model " c1(pcrlment, a number of tests were done on a flow 
of gas oil from a J"  nozzle (of the ordmary petrol pump type), the gas 011 
failing some 5 et. 1010 an open metal 011 drum. The gas oil used was said 
nol to have been ta�en from Ihe particular ship concerned, but was simply 
a representallve type of the gas 011 stored In the Depot. I t  IS not Intended 
10 suggest that these tests arc in any way representative of what would or 
mlsht occur within Tank o. 13, but they do show that IhlS commercial 
grade of gas oil was capable of producing static electrical charges with a very 
small quanlLty of the gas 011 ( 5  to 40 gallons) flowing through 3 very small 
Jet for a very small lime. In the tests. potenllals of several hundreds of volts 
\.\ere obtained. It Will be SCCn that the quantities of Oll are small, and I1 is 
to be c'(pected that the potentials withlO the tan).; would be very high. There i� n o  
doubt that the charges within the tank would be adequate to cause sparkmg. 
SubmerSion of the mJet pipe may be expected to reduce the risk but certainly 
nOI to remove it altogether and, whether commercially practicable. or not. 10 
od storage depots the risk cannot be entirely removed unless the gas above the 
liqUid level IS rendered non·mOammable, e.g., by purging with COl before filling, 
or by adoptmg on a larger "ca le the Introduction o[ solid CO", as IS already 
an estabhshed praclice 10 small tanks such as aircraft tanks. 
APPI NDIX 5. Enclosure J(A) 
The resistance across J number of j0ll11s in 6" pipes was taken. Tbese were 
of the order of 0.0004 to 0.0006 ohm. The jOlOt surfaces are packed for ou 
lightness but the continUity lS made by the flange bolts which may be about 
SIX t" bolts on some joints and thirteen t" bolts on other JOlDtS. The current 
carrying capaCII}' is therefore high and 11 Will be appreciated that the network 
of pipes is so den�e that frequently a current route would have a number of 
paths 10 parallel. 
A length of 6" pipe 2' 6" long gave a figure of 0.0005 ohm. ThiS again is .l 
random value With possibly many actual parallel paths between the two pOlOlS 
of contact of the instrument. 
The resistance to earth of the main deliver:r pipe from the ship to Tank No. I J  
was measured via IWO separate roules. One gave 0.07 ohm and the other 
0.09 ohm. I�rom the pOint of vIew of discharge of statiC, the delivery pipe can 
therefore be taken .IS an earth of negligible re�istance. 
A PPEVDIX 5. EntioHlrt' 1(8) 
[xtnlct from Mr. Leightou'!> Mtmor:mdullt on Cable froUl Regent Oil Co:!> 
m:.in sl'Hchgear to their main ('ump House 
" A  sketch (Fig. 4) shows the layout. The piece of cable between the 
two joint boxes was Inserted to replace a d.1.nlaged portIOn of the original cable 
about six years ago. 
The inspection and tests proved, in my oplIlIon, that no fault occurred ID 
thiS cable. The IIlsuhltlon values at Jomt box B \.\ere 10\.\, and some \.\ater 
was found m the Icad \\ rappmg and paper insulation al the end of the box 
near the pumphouse. The compound and all othcr installation were. however. 
10 excellent condition, and no Signs of bUTnlOg. puncture or Hashover were secn. 
The details of the tests were a.s follo\\.s : -
( I )  "'egger te!.1 of cable between first cuI .Ind s\\J!chgear near Regenl 
o. office 
Bct\.\een any core and �healh-20 megohms. 
Between (loy pair of cores 20 megohms. 
(2) f\legger test of cable bet\\.een second cut and Pumphouse­
Between any core and sheath-Infinity. 
Bet\,\.ecn an) pair of cores Infinlly. 
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(3) Tests on POri Ion of cable removed bet .... een first and second CUIS, at 
second cul-
First Core to sheath-200,OOO ohm!!;. 
Second Core to sheath-1 75.000 ohm,. 
Third Core to sheath-300.000 ohms. 
first to Second Core-300,OOO ohms. 
Second to Third Core-275.000 ohms. 
Third to First Core-1 50.000 ohms. 
Tht! caMe was thell ('Ill through a/ the third Cl/I. 
(4) Tests on portion between third .1nd second cuts. at second cut­
hrst Core to sheath-300.000 ohms. 
Second Core to sheath-220.000 ohms. 
Third ore 10 sheath-375,OOO ohm, . 
...  rst 10 Second Core-275.000 ohms. 
Second to Third Core-270,OOO ohms 
Third to hrst Core-l 50.000 ohms. 
(5) 1 csts on portion bch ...een first and third cuts. at Ihlrd cut­
hrst Core to shcath-40 megohms. 
Second Core 10 sheath-20 megohms. 
Tlurd Core 10 sheath-lOO megohms. 
rlrst to Second Core-75 megohms. 
econd to Third Core-75 megohms. 
Third 10 Fust Core- 1 5  megohms. 
The lid of JOint box B was lhen removed. The compound appeared In good 
condlllon and there \\Iere no signs of burning. The two eod damps were then 
removed wilhout slgn!l of trouble A drop or 1\\10 of water "as noted In a 
hole lR the compound 
The compound was then chipped OUI. and the JOint l ifted out of the bo�. 
Some water \\Ias Ihen noted at the lead wrapping at onc end of the box. 
(6) Test of POri Ion of cable between third cut and second CUI. at third cut. 
(Nore Continuity of cable sheath now broken at JOint bo'( B. due to removal 
of box.) 
I lrst ore to sheath 1 2  megohms. 
I)econd Core 10 sheath-1 2  megohms. 
Third ore to sheath-I I mcgohrns. 
(7) Test of porllon of cable bet .... een third cut and second cui. at  second 
cut (Nof(' : Continlllty of cable sheath now broken al joml box 8.) 
hrst Core to sheath-250.000 ohms. 
econd Core to o:healh-I 60.000 ohms. 
fhu'd Core to shealh-200,OOO ohms. 
The lead wrapplOg at  each end of the jomt .... as then removed. and water HS 
found between the l.lyers of lead. The paper under the leJd appeared d unp 
al the pump house end. -
(S) Test of portion of cable bCI\\een third CUI and second cut, at second 
cut, after removal of some wet insulating paper-
First Core to sheath-l megohm. 
Second C.ore 10 sheath-I.'1:5 megohm. 
rlrst Core 10 Second Core-450.000 ohm�. 
rile JOin! 1 0  Ihe cable ,11 JOlnl box B v.as then parlly untaped. but no sIgns of 
breakdown .Ippeared. 
Tile ('abh' W{/J' Iht'1I ellt ,hrollfth /IISI QII Ihe PIIl1II)hoIlSe sir/I' 0/ the joi"t B. 
at the fourth CII/. 
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(9) TC!st of pOrtion of cable between fourth cut and second cut, at  second 
cut, after separation of tails at joint box­
First Core to sheath-2 megohms. 
Second Core to sheath-2.5 megobms. 
Third Core la sheath-3.5 mC!gohms. 
First to Second Core-4 megohms. 
Second la Third Core-4 megohms. 
Third to First Core-4 megohms. 
( 1 0) Test of portion of cable between third and fourth cuts, at third cut­
All six tests-Infinity. 
Conclusion 
From the above I1 seems ciC!3r that the area of low insulal10n was on the 
pumphouse side of the cable joint at jOint box B due to Ingress of mOisture 
through the lead wrappmg under the clamp, hence wetling some of the paper 
Insulation of the cable. The cable was in a trench about 2 feel deep. which 
filled with water as the cable was dug up. III addition. a further head of about 
two feet of water, 011 and foam had remained above the surface of the ground 
for some days after the fire. 
The cable had been insulation-tested six months ago and was then in perfect 
condition. 
It therefore appears possible that the decrease in Insulation resistance had 
occurred slOce the fire. Removal of some of the wet paper, and separation 
of the cores. had the effect. it will be noted, of improving the insulation values, 
and leaves no room for doubt as to the location of the area of low insulation. 
There was however, no Sign of any breakdown having occurred." 
CIRCULAR LEITER. 
P1:.�ase quOfe ' 
84S J9�/ 1 .  
Gelltlemen. 
A PPENDIX fi 
HOME OFFICE. 
WHITEHALL. 
29111 May. 19�O. 
J am directed by the Secretary of State to Inform you that he has had under 
consideration the question of the arrangements to be made for local fire bngades 
to afford assistance in the event of a fire occurring at an explOSive or ammunition 
factory or large oil depot. 
It is recognised that in dealing with any such fire it would be necessary for 
any fire brigade attending to work in close co-operation with the management. 
Factory or depot managements are therefore advised to concert forthwith WIth 
tbe Chief Officer of the local fire brigade definite arrangements as 10 the 
procedure to be adopted 10 the event of fire breaking oul which IS beyond 
the scope of the factory's or depot's own apparatus or personnel. 
In devising a scheme of co-operation With local fire brigades. It IS most 
important that the factory or depot management should apPoint a person 00 
duty at the factory or depot who would be responsible for calling in the local 
fire brigade if a fire occurs which cannot be dealt with effectively by the factory 
or depot. If, because of the special risks at the factory or depot, it is undeSirable 
that local brigades should enter the premises as they arrive, arrangements should 
be made with the Chief Officers concerned for a brigade or brigades attending 
to proceed to a pre-arranged rallying point until it can be definitely settled where 
they should get to work. 
Rough plans of the premises should be supplied to the Chief Officer of the 
local fire brigade and also to other brigades which might be called in by him 
as reinforcements under the Fire Brigades Regional Orders. The plans should 
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show the location of all  POlOt3 of water supply and the approaches to the f.ictory 
or depot. 
I am 31')0 to draw your allentlon 10 sectIOn 14 (3) of the Fire Brigades Act. 
1938, which deals with the control of fire bngade operations at fires. Thai Section 
provides that the Senior Officer present of the fire bngade maintained for 
the Borough or District in \\-hlch the fire originates shall have fuU charge of 
the operations for the e'l(tlnctlon of the fire. unless under any scheme or 
arrangement made In pursuance of the rlre Bngades Act there is some different 
prOVISion, In which case the other person so designated shall have tbe charge. 
The object of this latter exception is to provide for special cases, e.g. where. 
In the ase of fire at an explOSive works or 011 depot which constitutes a fire 
fisk of a special character, It may be preferable for the operations at the 
fire to be in the control of the Chler Officer of the factory or depot brigade 
or oDe of Ihe staff with the reqUIsite technical knowledge of the plant and the 
manufacturing processes carried on. The desirability of laking advantage of 
these statutory powers IS a maller which might well be discussed by the factory 
or depot management with the local fire authOrity. In special cases, ilS part of 
the concerted arrangements referred to above. 
It  should be borne In mind that if reinforcements at a fire are to be called 
for under the Fire Brigade� Regional Orders, the channel through which such 
additional assistance IS to be obtained IS the Chief Officer of the local fire 
brigade, who IS in po�sesslon of full particulars of the regional reinforcement 
Scheme. 
A copy of this letter has been sent (0 the Chlcf Officer of the local fire bri�ade 
for your district. 
am. 
Gentlemen. 
Your obedient Servant. 
(Signed) W. 1\1. GOODE 
A PPENDIX 7 
Reg. No. 32 
• Plan nOI �ho""n In ,hi'> Report. 
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3. Due precaution shall at all times be taken for the prevention of accident 
from fire and in no ci.rcumstances shall fire or artificial light as will igmte 
mflammable vapour be permilted within. or ncarer than 100 fl. of the openmgs 
of buildings, workrooms or places where petroJeum�spirit is kept or used 
unless prior written approval is given by the Docks Engmeer and such con· 
ditions as may be Imposed by him are observed. 
4. Petroleum·splrit shall not be allowed 10 enter any inlet or drain com­
municating with the public sewer ; and every such IOlet shall be provided 
with an intercepting chamber or trap so constructed as to prevent effectu.tlly 
the accidental discharge into a drain of pelroleum·spiril. 
S. No substance other than petroleum·spirit shall be deposited or kept ID 
tbe place prescribed JO the first condlllon of this Licence. 
6. fucept iD so far as is special!} provided for in thc first conditIOn of 
IhlS Licence all petroleum·spirit kept upon the premises shall be exclusively 
contalllcd in strong metal vessels. the opcnlllgs of which are co\'ered With fine 
wire gauze and fitted With screw caps and with secure taps so constructed 
and connected as to prevent leakage or the escape of vapour : and such 
vessels and taps shall be kept in thoroughly good order. 
7. There shall be attached to. or. where that is impracticable, dlSpla�ed 
near, every vessel contalllmg the petroleum·splrit. a label. showing 111 con­
spicuous characters. the words .. PETROLEUM-SPI RIT " and the words 
.
. 
HIGHLY INFLAMMABLE ,. and 0) in the case of petroleum-spirit kept. 
the name and address of the consignee or owner : (ii) in the case of petroleum· 
spirit sent or conveyed. the name and address of the sender ; (iii) in the c:tse 
of pctroleum·spirit sold or exposed or offered for sale. the name and address 
of the vendor. 
8. Petroleum-splflt shall be conveyed to or from the licensed premises only 
\0 closed vessels so constructed a<; to be entirely free from leakage. 
9. No petroleum·spirit shall be conveyed to or from the licensed premises 
10 a vehicle in which gLlnpowder or other article likely to cau .. e fire or 
explosion shall be also carried. 
10. No match or other explosive or inflammable thing shall be allowed . .tnd 
no person shall be permitted to smoke at any time in any building or plilce 
where petroleum-spirit is kept or used under this Licence. 
1 1 .  The vessels containing petroleum·spirit shall be opened upon the licensed 
premises only at or Immediately adjoining the place of storage, and only for 
such time as is necessary for the dra .... ing off of tbe petroleum-spirit. DUring 
such drawing off every reasonable precaution shall be adopted for preventing 
the escape of pclroleum·splrit or the vapour tberefrom. 
12. All petroleum-spirit received upon the premises shall at once be taken 
to the place of storage : and all petroleum-spirit taken from the place of 
storage for delivery or otherwise shall at once be removed from the premise� 
13. The licensed premises shall at all times be watched and guarded b} J 
competent person or persons. 
14. The Licensee shall take effectual precautions for preventing unauthorhcd 
persons and all persons under the age of fifteen years from obtaininit acc.!..;s 
to the place of storage. 
IS.  Petroleum-spirit shall not be kepI or used in any part of the premi�e<; 
other than as specified in this Licence. 
16. Buildings or workroom in which petroleum-spirit is kept or used shall 
at all times be thoroughly ventilated into the external atmosphere. 
17. The vessels containing petroleum·splfIl placed In the store shall be so 
arranged as not to obstruct any ventilation opening. 
18.  A shovel and a sufficient quanlllY of fine sand. or other form of fire 
extmguisher approved by the Docks Engmeer or his duly authorised agent. 
lihall be kept in or near the store and in any workroom or place where 
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pelrolcUOl-SPIrII IS used. and a sufficumt quanlity of sand shall be spread 
round ever) lan� or vessel conl3lning any petroleum-spirit for the purpose 
of absorbing any leakage. 
19 The Docks Engineer or hiS duly .luthorlScd agent shall al all times be 
..IlIoy,.ed free access to the premises for the purpose of ascertain 109 If the 
condlllons :lltached 10 thiS licence are properly observed and of oblatnlDg 
5.lmples of petrol.eum-splrIl on payment therdor. The Llcensec shall give 
any 3'iSlslance which such Officer may require. 
20. No carria�e, wagon. cart, dray or olher such vehicle. however drawn 
or propelled shall be used for the carriage of petroleum-spint from place to 
place .lflCr nollce bas been given by Ihe Docks Englncer or hiS duly authorISed 
agent that su h vehicle IS considered unsatisfactory for such purpose. 
:2 1 .  No suppl ies of petroleum-spirit shall be receIVed after one hour after 
sunset 
12. Every vehlde used for the conveyance of petroleum-spirit. whilst stand 109 
In or n�ar the licensed premises or whilst conveYing pClrolcum-sptrtt, shall 
e prOVided Wllh a SUitable and emCICnl fire e:tlinglHsher. and a responSible 
person conversant with the use of such fire e:ttlOguisher shall be In atlendance 
upon each vehicle whilst car.rying pelroleum-spim an� due precaution shall be taken to prevent un�uthonsed persons Interfenng with the petroleum-splflt 
being so conveyed or wuh the vehicle used for the conveyance of the same 
23. Doors. or other means of access to the mechanism of any petrol pump on 
the IJccnsed premlSCs shall at all times when the pump IS not In use be kept 
closed and locked. 
:!4. All empty \essels which have conlamed petroleum-splflt shall at all times 
be kepi securel) closed except dunng such tllne a� such vessels are undergomg 
repair 
25. All cmpty vessels which have contained petroleum-splfIl shall be kept 
",!lhm the place of storage (premises descnbed in the lease to the Compan) 
referred to JO Condition 28 below). 
�6. All persons employed dlreerl) or mdlrectl} by the Licensee having access 
10 the premiscs herein before men lion cd shall act In accordance with and obse[\"c 
the �c\'er31 condJllons of thiS Licence. 
17. The Licensee shall forthwith po3t and cause to be J..ept posted OD the 
premises to \\ hlch this Licence relates m 'iuch form and In such pOSition as 10 
be easily re<ld b) the persons employed In or about the said premises a notice 
settmg out the conditions of this Lic�nce. and the licensee sh:lll use his best 
endeavollf'i 10 cause the said conditions 10 be properly understood by the 
persons employed in or about the said premises. 
:28. ThiS l icence does nOI authOrISe the keepmg or stormg of carbide of 
calcium 
29. Nothmg III Ihls LIcence or m the foregomg conditions IS mtended or 
















of the Board of Trade or other Government Department. or By-Law or Regu­
lation made by the Harbour Authonty (or m the lease wilh the Company 
dated the 2 1 3t day of June. 1934). 
30. Throughout Ihls Licence and Ihe condlllons attached therelo the expr�s­
SI on pelro)eum-splflt " shall be deemed to Include as well as pelroleum-splflt any substance cont:lining pelroleum-splflt and any product or reSidue derived 
from petroleum-spint. 
01ve under m) hand on behalf of the s'lId Harbour Authonty thiS second 
d.l) of Apnl, 1948. 
ISgd.) w. G. NEALE. 
Secretary, 
Bnslol Docks Undertakmg. 
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The follo\\ mg ('\tfacts from the Petroleum (Consolidation) Acl. 1928. should 
be carefully read. 
Section I. 
f I1 c-.;ubJccl to the provisIOns of IhlS Ac!. pClrolcum�sPJrlI :.nall not be kepi 
lInle�, ,J. pctroleum,�plrIl licence IS In force under Ihis Act authorismg the keepmg 
thereof .t nd the petroleum-spirit IS kepI In accordance with such conditIOn!.. 11 
dO). JS ma) be attached 10 the Licence . .  
(2) The occupier of .lny premises In .... 11Ich petroleum-splrI! IS kePI In conlrJ­
vcntion of this sectIOn -thall be liable on summary conVICllon to a fine not (''(ceed· 
109 ("cnl) pounds for (,\CfY day on y,hlch the contravention occurs or continues. 
and the courI before \\hom an) pcr:.on IS con\lcted under thiS sub·sectlOn IllJY 
order thJ! the petroleum-spirit in rc�specl of \\ h ich the contravention occurs. Jnd 
an) \e<;'iel in " h lch it IS contained be forfeited or other\\lse dealt \�Ith In such 
manner as the cOllrt think fit. 
( 3 )  If an) person to \\hom J petroleum-sptnt licence I� granted contravenes 
In} condition of the hcence. he shall be 1I.1ble on summary conviction to a fine 
not e"\.ceedlng twent} pounds for e\'cry da} on which the contravention occurs 
or continues 
Sl'llioll 1 
(3) A I()(;.tl J.ulhuflt} ml} ,ltlach to ,Jny petroleum,splrlt licence sllch con­
ditions a"i they think. e}l.pc(lient as to the mode of storage. the nature and ,,1ludllon 
of the prcmlses In ""hich, and the nature of the goods With which petroleum­
'iPlflt I� to he stored. the facilities for the lestlllg of petroleum-splfll from time 
10 lime. and gener.tll) a� to the safe·keepmg of petroleum-spirit . 
(�) Where condilions to be obsened bI persons cmplo)ed .He attached to an} 
petroleum-'iopmt l icence. the OCllpler of the prcllllo;;es to which the licence relates 
,hall c,llIse to be kept po<iled on thc premlo;;e". lO slIch form and In such POSH Ion 
." .. [0 he e.IQh re.1d b) the pi!�SOn'l cmplo}cd on the premises. a notice SCltlO£ 
out those com.iJuon'). and 
(a) I f  the occupier of any premises f:!.lb to comply \\ Ith the foregolOg require:­
mcnts of this sub·sectlon. he shall be !table on summary conviction to a fine 
not e"\.ceedlOg five pounds for every day on which the failure occurs or 
contlOues : and 
Ch) If any person pulls do\\n. lOJures. or defaces an} notice posled \0 .lccord· 
lncc \\llh Ihe requirements of thiS sllb-�ectlOn. he shall be liable on summar) 
conviction 10 a fine not e"\.cecdmg five pounds . .. lnd 
C( 1 If an) person cmplo)ed contr.tvencs an} condition of which notice h,l\ 
been given In :lccord,lnce with the reqllJremcnts of thiS o;;ub·seclion. he Sh,lll 
be !i,lble on summan convlc'lon 10 a,fine !lot exceed 109 five pounds 
SI!t.:lioll S. 
( I)  C;;ubJcct as heretn.tltcr provided where .In}' petroleum·splrlt 
((I) Is kept al any place � or 
I b) i\ <ient or conveyed bcl\\een all\ t\\U pl.u:c, 111 Gre.l.t Bnt.un . 
ld IS sold or exposed or olTered for .').1lc : 
there ,hall be allJched to. or. "here that IS Impracticable. displayed near. the 
vessel containang the pet(oicum,splril. a label shewing. in consplClIOUS characters. 
the word .. -
.• PETROLEU�I SPIR IT " .nd the ",ord, " HIGHLY INFLA'I MABLF " 
and-
(i) In the case of petroleum,splrit lept. the name and address of the 
consignee or owner ; 
(ill in the case of petroleum-spim sent or conveyed. the name and addrelis 
of the sender : 
(ili) in the case of  pctrolcum·"plrit .. old or c"'(posed or oO"cred for "ale. 
the name and address of the vr:ndor . 
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(2) Any pcr�on who keeps. !lend�. conveys, sell.!. or expose� or ollcr� [or �ale 
an)' petroleum·spml In contravention of this section shall be liable on summary 
conviction to it fine not c�ceedlng five pounds and the court befo[e .... hom an� 
person I� convicted I n  rcspect of any such contravention may ordcr that the 
pelrolcum· ... plfll. In respect of which the CQnlravenllOn occurs. and any vessel 
In .... hl h It i'i contained be forfclled or othcrwise dealt .... Ilh In such manner dS 
Ihe court thinks fit 
('(Iiol/ 1 3  
( I )  Whenever .IOY dccldcnt which occa�ions loss of life o r  personal . InJur) 
{lC urs by CXplO'ilOn or by firc m or about or In conncctlon With any hcensed 
preml.,c'i Ihe occupier 01 the premiscs shilll. If Ihe e'Xploslon or fire Involvcd 
petroleum·splrlt. forthWith send or caUSe to be 'iCnl to Ihe Secretary of State 
nOllce of the aCCident and of the loss of life or personal Injury, A nOlice of iln) 
accldenl of .... hlch notice l'i sent In pursuance of Ihl'S secllon need nol be sent 
to ilny inspeclor of factories 
(2) Where. In. about. or In conneclion With dny ship or vehicle on whIch 
pClrolcltm·'ipmt l'i bems conveyed o r  loaded or from wh,ch petroleum·splrit 
,� bcmS unloaded. any ilccident which occasions loss of hfe. or personal InJur� 
OCCll('i by e'\plo'ilon or by fire. Ihe owner or the master of the 'ihlp or vehicle 
... hall. 1 1  the c,,"plO'ilon or lire mvolved petroleum·splrlt. forth With send or cause to 
I)e 'iCllt 10 the �ecretar} of Stale nollce of the aCCIdent and of the loss of Itfe 
IIr per�ond l InJllf} " bUI thHi provision shall not appl) ..... here the pelroleum·splrlt 
l;arnet.i or loaded. on. or unloaded from the ship or \ehlcle l'i or v."as for use 
only on thal 'ihlp or vehicle or III an) case In .... hich sllch nollce as aforesaid 
IS otherwl'ic by IJw required to be senl to some government department 
(3) I \ery �lIch occufller. o ..... ner. or master as aforesaid \0, ho fails 10 compl� 
'Wuh In) of the pro\ ISlon� of thl� sechon shall be hable on summar) conviction 
10 a flne not exceeding t\O,enl) pounds 
!It'( IIO'' 23 
In tlw, At.:t un lc!>!I the conte't other .... ,�c requlr":s. the follo ..... mg e\ pressions 
h"ve the meanmg" hereby respectively assigned to Ihem (thal IS to say) : -
.. Pelroleulll " Include., crude petroleum 011 made from petroleum or from 
coal. .. hale. peat or olher bituminOUs subo;lance. and othec products of petroleum 
.. Petroleum· ... pLflt "" means 'Such pClroleum a'; when lested m lhe manner 
')el lorth In PMt 11 01 the Second Schedule 10 thiS Act gives 011 an Inflammable 
vdl'our ,Lt i\ temperature of 1cs� than "evcnt� ·three degree ... 1"ahrenhell 
H O. 225 C 
t:XTK"C .... FRO�l ' l 1 1 E  l'ETKOLEUM (CONSOLllMT10N) "Cl'. I92H 
FirSI Schedule 
I?flln ,,/ 1 1" "' pm"lIh!e ill "('"�p(Tr 0/ /in"//(('<; 10 kt'l"P PI'trolelllll·"\p"H 
In re,pe\:"1 of a licence 10 �eep a qUJntlt� 
Rates PCI 0/1/111//1 
of fel's plIyable' 
£ s. d 
NOI e\:cecdlllg 100 gallons 5 0 
I \:ceeding 100 gallons" nol e\ceedlllg 500 gallon.. 10 0 
E\.cceding 500 gallon'), nOI cxceedlllg 1 .000 galloO'i 15 0 
[,ceedmg 1 .000 gJllons, nol e'(ceedlng 5.000 gallons 0 0 
E'(ceedmg 5.000 gallons. not exceeding 10,000 gallons 0 0 
.3xceed mg 10.000 gallons. not exceeding 20"000 gallons 0 0 
E'(ceedmg 20.000 gJllon'i. nol exceedlllg 50.000 gallons 0 0 
E'(ceeding 50.000 gallons 0 0 
Note " In the case of 3 solid substance for which by virtue of an Order in 
oune.1 made under C;cclIon nineteen of thili Act. 3 l icence is required to be 
gr,lntcd under the 'i.tld <ieclion the fce pa}able under Ihe 'khedule �hall be 
..:.Ilculatcd as d ten pound., "elghl or the '>ubslance "ere eqlllva.lent to one gallon 
3R 
RENEWAL or LICENCE 
This licence I!I hereb} rcne\\ed so as (0 be In torce lor the period of ,"elve 
months from the Isl  dOl) of Aprtl. 1949. 
l1)gd.) W G. NF.AU!, 
<)ccrctar), 
Brtstol Dock ... Undcrto.lklng 
RENEWAL OF LlCEl\CE 
rh IS hcence IS hereby renewed so as 10 be m force for the period of twelve 
months from the 1st da) of April . 1950. 
(Sgd.) W. G. EAI I . 
<;ecretary. 
Bristol Oach Undertaking 
RENEWAL O F  LICENCE 
ThiS licence I S  hereb) rcnc\\ed so as 10 be In force for Ihe penod of l\I.elve 
months from the 1st d.lY of Aprtl. 1 9 5 1 .  
(Sgd.) W .  G. EALP. 
Secretary. 
Bnl"lol Docks Undertakmg 
RENEWAL OF LICENCE 
ThiS licence I� hereby renewed 'iO as to be m force for the penod of twelve 
monlh� from the day of . 19 
Secretary. 
Bristol Doc)..s UndcrtJkmg. 
RENEWAL 0 1  LICENCE 
ThiS licence IS hereby renewed so as to be In force for the penoll of twelve 
monlhc; from the day of • 19 
Secretary. 
Bri"tol Docks Undertak Ing. 
RENEWAL OF LICENCE 
rhls licence IS hereby rcnclA.ed so a!> to be In force [or the period of fwelve 
months from the day of . 19 
39 
Secretary, 
Bm.tol Dad. " Undertakm.!; 
I·ORT 01- HRISTOL AU'I I tORIT'\ 
SPECIAL CO 'on-IONS FOR ELECTRICALI. Y OI'ERA I EO PETROL 
PUMPS 
All clectril:oJlly opcr.itcd petrol pumps mUSI comply "'lth the follo\\lng specloJl 
I.:()ndlllon ... ", 1 .. 111..1 do\\n m Home Ofh�e Clrculur 19X 19-n. ddted :!5th September, 
1�47 
The followll1& condition.;; sh<.tll appl) 10 electrically opcr,tlcd pump., lor the 
delivcry of petrol 
(a) Pump \Iolor�. I he cncJo.,urc .. of pump motor., !!Ihull be or flume proof 
construction 
(bl S"itchgeur. The casings 01 all s"-Itchc!l. cont.iclors or relays situated 
wlthlll or on the pump eqUIpment housing. and whether used for power. 
lighting or other purpose. shall be of flame proof construction. 
(c) Lil!ht ing l,juinl,!!I. Lighting f1ltlng!. sll tli\Ied "'Ithln or p.lftl) \\ lIhlO thl' 
pump equipment housmg. !lhall be of flame proof construction. Llghtmg 
flltmge; mounted on the outSide of the pump eqUIpment housing shall be of 
'In enclosed design JIl "' h ich Ihe lamp IS protected by a \\ell glass or other 
glit"'''' ... ealed to the body of the hltmg by a gi..le;kcl so as 10 re!.lst the mgress 
of petroleum SPIrit vapour mto the fittmg. 
(d) \\ iring. All cables \\ ithm the pump equipment hou\mg .. hall be enclosed 
m he.1\ y g.luge g.iI\ .iOl ... ed sohd-dra"-n steel condUIt. The ends of the condUit 
shall be scre\\ed mto the flame proof app,u.itus and Into condUit filtlOgs. 
where the Jailer .Ire used. so as to engage the threads by at least onc lOch. 
the Jomt .. to be treated ag.imst mgres ... of \�Jler. AlternatIvely. mineral­
In\ulaled copper-.,heathcd cable \\ Ith appropriate name proof fittings mol} 
be u"ied. 
(t'l Conduit I-illing"l. All condUit IIttmg) \\-Ithm the pump equipment hou!.mg. 
such as Inspeclton bends and Jomt bo,es . .,h;J1I be of flameproof construcllon 
and galvanised 
(f) Connection of SUPIII.\ Cables. onncclion of e1ectriclt) supply shall be 
made to (he flame proof part of the installatIOn '" uhm the pump eqUipment 
hou.,mg by mC.in� of \\lrmg enclosed In hea ... y gauge gJlvanlsed solid-dra\\" 
�re\\'ed .. teel conduit. the end of \\ hlch \\ Ithm the hou ... mg shall engage 
thc lermlnatlon provided b) the pump manufacturer b) not Ic'iSO than one lOch 
rhe condlllL should prcferably be m an llObroken length WIthin the base of 
the pump. but If the conduit filtmg:. are necee;sary because of the nature of 
the condUIt run. Ihey ... hould be of flame proof t} pe a s  re) above. Joints 
shall be trealed ag,unst the ingres of water. Alternaltvely. mmeral-msulated 
copper-sheathed cable \\'Jlh appropriate flame proof fiUmgs m;J) be used 
CondUit or copper 'iheath shall not be used a .. onc of the conductors suppl)­
mg the apparatus.. i.e .. illl conductors of the .,upply ", inng 'ihall be insulated. 
Ct,-) EMthing. rhe metal encloe;ure.;; of ,111 ilppar:tll1<; and the conduit shall be 
efliclentl) earthed 
(Id I::.lectrical l'rOlection. -I he suppl) ClrClUI"I 01 eJ.�h pump shull be 
!lep.lr,\lel� protected b} fuses or clrcult·brea�ere;. e;et 10 operate at a current 
value ae; near a') pri.l cllcable to Ihe normal current ta�en b� the apparatus 
rhe fmcs or clrclllt-breaJ-crs o:.hall not be "Iltuated \\ lIhm or on the pump 
equipment hou .. mg 
The term .
. 
flameproof ". applied 10 electncal app:uatll .. and used 10 the 
t:ondllions .. h,ll1 denote apparatus ", h ,ch IS  ccrtlhed to Group I1 standard b) 
the Tel,tmg Authontj (The \l mistr) of rue I Jnd Po\\er) 10 accordance \\;ILh 
Bnllsh tandards 0\ 229 and 889 ;to:. appropriale and \\ hich ,<; nl.lrJ..ed With the 
flame proof certificate number. 
'" \ I() �J 0 I cr \ Jf4W!1 
(�gd.l W . . NEALr. 
�ecrctar\". 
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